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I. INTRODUCTION
"States have the obligation to protect and preserve the marine
environment."'
1. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Oct. 7, 1982, art. 192, 21 I.L.M.
1261, 1308 [hereinafter LOS Convention]; see also Aldo E. Chircop, The Marine
Transportation of Hazardous and Dangerous Goods in the Law of the Sea-An Emerging
Regime, 11 DALHOUSIE L.J. 612, 629-30 (1988). The convention requires all states to
minimize the release of toxic substances into the marine environment, including "pollution
from vessels, in particular measures for preventing accidents .... ensuring the safety of
operations at sea, preventing intentional and unintentional discharges, and regulating the
design, construction, equipment, operation, and manning of vessels." LOS Convention, supra,
art. 194, para. 3(b), 21 I.L.M. at 1308. Further, flag states must enforce violations of pollution
laws applying to their ships, including adequate inspection, certification, penalties, and
investigation. Id. art. 217, para. 3.
Conversely, the convention recognizes that states have a right, based on their sovereignty,
to protect and preserve the marine environment off their coasts and in their economic zones.
See id. art. 56, para. l(b)(iii).
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More than fifty percent of all cargo transported by sea, whether
solid, liquid, or gas, consists of hazardous or noxious substances
(HNS). 2 Due to increased shipment of HNS by sea, worldwide con-
cern with the risks of HNS, growing public environmental awareness,
and the economic and non-economic implications of maritime acci-
dents,3 the international community has formulated and adopted
standards of ship design, construction, and operation to promote mar-
itime safety and decrease the probability of and resultant damage
from marine pollution caused by HNS.4 Current international law,
2. CLEOPATRA E. HENRY, THE CARRIAGE OF DANGEROUS GOODS BY SEA 92 (1985);
see also Chircop, supra note 1, at 613. Because of the complex administrative and economic
issues involved, the definition of HNS is a point on which the International Maritime
Organization (IMO) cannot currently agree. This dissent is one reason why the IMO did not
adopt the 1984 Draft Convention on Liability and Compensation in Connection with the
Carriage of Noxious and Hazardous Substances by Sea, see infra note 3. A recent American
proposal to the Convention defines HNS as "substances defined . . . as either 'dangerous
cargoes' or 'flammable residues'" which are listed in specific annexes to the convention.
Consideration of a Draft Convention on Liability and Compensation in Connection with the
Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea, Submission by the United States, IMO
Legal Comm. 63rd Sess., Agenda Item 3, para. 7.1, IMO Doc. LEG 63/3/3 para. 7.1 (Aug.
17, 1990). The most recent Draft Convention substitutes the term "dangerous goods" for
"HNS" and defines "dangerous goods" very broadly, incorporating hazardous substances
listed under several international pollution conventions and ship construction codes. See infra
notes 224-29 and accompanying text.
The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution From Ships, 1973, and its
1978 Protocol define "harmful substance" as "any substance which, if introduced into the sea,
is liable to create hazards to human health, to harm living resources and marine life .... or to
interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea .... ." International Convention for the
Prevention of Pollution From Ships, 1973, Nov. 2, 1973, art. 2, para. 2, 12 I.L.M. 1319, 1320
(1973); Protocol of 1978 Relating to the International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution From Ships, 1973, Feb. 17, 1978, (entered into force Oct. 2, 1983), reprinted in 3
NAGENDRA SINGH, INTERNATIONAL MARITIME LAW CONVENTIONS, at 2414 (1983)
[hereinafter MARPOL 73/78] (prohibiting all forms of intentional pollution of the sea from
ships).
The essential problem of "hazardous goods," as Chircop points out, "concerns the
management of goods which by their very nature ... may potentially impair human welfare,
vessel and cargo safety, certain marine uses, and the health of the ocean and coastal
environment." Chircop, supra note 1, at 613-15.
3. Damages from HNS incidents can include property and environmental damage,
personal injury, loss of life, cleanup costs, and preventive measures costs. See Draft
Convention on Liability and Compensation in Connexion With the Carriage of Noxious and
Hazardous Substances by Sea, IMO Legal Comm., Agenda Item 6, art. 1, para. 6, IMO Doc.
LEG/CONF.6/3 (Jan. 13, 1984), reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 150, 151 (1984) [hereinafter 1984
Draft HNS Convention].
4. Aline F. De Bievre, Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection with the
Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances By Sea, 17 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 61, 61 (1986).
The United Nations Group on the Scientific Aspects of Marine Pollution defines "marine
pollution" as the "[i]ntroduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substance or energy into the
marine environment (including estuaries) resulting in such deleterious effects as harm to living
resources, hazard to human health, hindrance of marine activities including fishing,
impairment of quality for use of sea water and reduction of amenities." Quoted in Michael
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however, does not adequately address a second, important aspect of
the marine pollution problem: adequate compensation of the victims
of HNS incidents. Currently, no internationally accepted agreement
exists that assigns liability and compensation for damages caused by
HNS accidents. Current international law, embodied in such interna-
tional pacts as the International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code
(IMDGC),5 has been described as inadequate to deal with the
problem.6
Several interests are involved in any consideration of liability for
damages resulting from the international marine transportation of
hazardous goods. First, the international community must balance
the competing interests of unencumbered international commerce
against protecting the marine environment." Second, individual
nations have specific interests, particularly in terms of territorial juris-
Hardy, Definition and Forms of Marine Pollution, in 3 NEw DIRECTIONS IN THE LAW 73, 73
(Robin Churchill, et al. eds., 1973).
5. INTER-GOVERNMENTAL MARITIME CONSULTIVE ORGANIZATION, INTERNATIONAL
MARITIME DANGEROUS GOODS CODE (1977) [hereinafter IMDGC]. The IMDGC is a guide
to mariners and shippers of dangerous goods that provides information on the goods' nature.
It is descriptive, rather than regulatory, and is not internationally enforceable. See Edgar
Gold, Legal Aspects of the Transportation of Dangerous Goods at Sea, 10 MARINE POL'Y 185,
186 (1986); see also infra note 214.
6. Synopsis, Recent Developments in the Law of the Sea 1983-1984, 22 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 801, 832 (1985).
7. Chircop, supra note 1, at 615. The international community, not solitary states, must
tackle the problem. First, the international community can efficiently disseminate HNS
information. Second, international participation best promotes uniformity of law, and
facilitates international navigation and trade. Third, international participation encourages
even the smallest state to concern itself with and take steps to correct the problem. Finally, an
international regime is the most efficient way of handling cross-national liability and
compensation issues.
The international community must cooperate to solve the HNS problem. Principle 24 of
the Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment
states:
International matters concerning the protection and improvement of the
environment should be handled in a co-operative spirit by all countries, big or
small, on an equal footing. Co-operation through multilateral or bilateral
arrangements or other appropriate means is essential to effectively control,
prevent, reduce, and eliminate adverse environmental effects resulting from
activities conducted in all spheres, in such a way that due account is taken of the
sovereignty and interests of all States.
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14 and Corr.
1, Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, reprinted in 11 I.L.M.
1416, 1420-21 (1972). The UN Law of the Sea Convention reiterates this principle:
States shall co-operate on a global basis and, as appropriate, on a regional basis,
directly or through competent international organizations, in formulating and
elaborating international rules, standards, and recommended practices and pro-
cedures consistent with this Convention, for the protection and preservation of
the marine environment, taking into account characteristic regional features.
LOS Convention, supra note 1, art. 197.
1992]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:1009
diction, where they are primarily responsible for making and enforc-
ing any marine protection scheme.8 Third, special interest groups
have relevant concerns. For example, shippers want economic, safe
shipment of their cargo. Shipowners want economic, safe, and unen-
cumbered movement of their vessels. Seamen and shipboard workers
have concerns regarding their health and the safety of their work
environment. Insurers have ultimate financial responsibility for any
system of liability compensation. 9 Developing countries that desire to
expand their maritime industries find it difficult to comply with inter-
national rules for ship design, construction, equipment, and manning,
and fear damage to their shipping industries from further imposition
of liability. 10 As a result of these competing factors, any successful
international scheme for carrying hazardous substances and assigning
liability for HNS accidents must provide for: (a) human safety;
(b) protection of the marine environment; (c) free international navi-
gation; (d) polluter liability; (e) compensation for injured parties;
(f) assistance for developing countries; (g) the free exchange of infor-
mation and technology; and (h) international cooperation."'
In September, 1977, faced with an increase in maritime accidents
8. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea gives coastal states sovereign
rights to explore, exploit, and manage the living resources of its 200 nautical mile "Exclusive
Economic Zone" (EEZ). The convention gives coastal states jurisdiction to establish and use
artificial islands, installations, and structures; to conduct marine scientific research; and to
protect and preserve the marine environment. LOS Convention, supra note 1, arts. 55-60.
In further support of coastal state interest, article 221 states:
1. Nothing in this Part shall prejudice the right of States, pursuant to
international law, both customary and conventional, to take and enforce
measures beyond the territorial sea proportionate to the actual or threatened
damage to protect their coastline or related interests, including fishing, from
pollution or threat of pollution following upon a maritime casualty or acts
relating to such a casualty, which may reasonably be expected to result in major
harmful consequences.
2. For the purpose of this article, "maritime casualty" means a collision of
vessels, stranding or other incident of navigation, or other occurrence on board a
vessel or external to it resulting in material damage or imminent threat of
material damage to a vessel or cargo.
Id. art. 221.
9. Chircop, supra note 1, at 615-16.
10. Id. at 618. Chircop also asserts that international organizations such as the United
Nations Environment Program (UNEP), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),
the International Labor Organization (ILO), the World Health Organization (WHO), the
Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), and the World Meteorological Organization
(WMO) have interests in marine accidents and the associated pollution liability scheme due to
the nature of their work. Id. at 616. Also, various other interests may become involved as a
result of each particular incident. For example, in a collision scenario, salvage and towing
concerns may become relevant. Id. at 616 n.7.
11. Id. at 623-25.
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involving HNS,1 2 the Legal Committee of the International Maritime
Organization (IMO) gave "highest priority" to work on a comprehen-
sive international convention1 3 to establish a liability and compensa-
tion system for damage caused by vessels carrying HNS at sea.14 As a
result, an international conference was held at IMO headquarters in
London from April 30 to May 25, 1984.15 Seventy member states and
thirty observer nations considered the Draft HNS Convention. 6 The
conference did not ratify the draft convention proposed by the Legal
Committee, however, because time constraints prohibited resolution
of the complex issues involved. 7 The conference returned the draft to
the Legal Committee to for additional work." The Legal Committee
has since been at work on a revised draft convention for consideration
at a future diplomatic conference. The conference will probably con-
vene in 1994.19
This Comment will trace the evolution of the 1984 Draft HNS
Convention to the 1991 Draft HNS Convention, with emphasis on the
work of the IMO Legal Committee to revise the draft and on the
various proposals from all countries that are being considered. It will
discuss the following issues that have prevented the draft from gain-
ing international acceptance: equitable apportionment of liability
between shipowners and shipping interests, substances to be covered
by the convention, and funding of the liability scheme. Part II of this
Comment will briefly discuss the history of the IMO and international
agreements with respect to the maritime shipment of hazardous and
noxious substances. Part III will discuss the text of the 1984 Draft
and the reasons why it was not adopted. This part will also focus on
the concept of "damage" as defined in the Draft Convention, the defi-
12. See infra notes 32-64 and accompanying text.
13. A "convention," synonymous with "treaty" or "agreement," is a legal statement of an
international undertaking. It is intended to provide a clear, conclusive statement of the rights
of the states that are party to it vis-a-vis each other. A convention is binding generally only on
ratifying states, unless it becomes part of customary international law by subsequent general
practice. R.R. CHURCHILL & A.V. LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 5 (1988).
14. De Bievre, supra note 4, at 68-69 (quoting the Resolution of the Legal Committee, IMO
Doc. LEG 33/5, para. 52 (1977)). This Comment discusses the ensuing proceedings to
develop this liability and compensation system. The 1984 Draft HNS Convention, supra note
2, has not been passed due to the inability of the delegates to agree on definitions, liability, and
funding for catastrophic damage.
15. See International Maritime Organization: Convening of an International Conference on
Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection with the Carriage of Certain Substances
by Sea, Circular Letter No. 958 (Nov. 2, 1983), reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 148 (1984).
16. De Bievre, supra note 4, at 72.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 72-3.
19. Telephone Interview with Capt. J. Collum, United States Coast Guard, Chief, Coast
Guard Maritime and International Law Division (Oct. 22, 1991).
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nition of "hazardous substance," and the types of cargo affected. Part
III will further discuss several concepts addressed by the Legal Com-
mittee that depart from traditional international admiralty law in the
areas of strict liability, limitation of liability, mixed liability of the
shipper and shipowner, and requirements for compulsory insurance.
Part IV will discuss the negotiations that were conducted for a revised
Draft Convention. Part V will explore the substance of the most
recent Draft, promulgated in January, 1991. 20 Finally, Part VI will
analyze the future work of the Legal Committee in anticipation of the
pending 1994 international diplomatic conference.
It has been said that, too often, the international approach to this
type of problem is determined by the type of pollutant spilled (e.g.,
oil, radioactive waste), its method of introduction into the sea (e.g.,
ocean dumping, routine operations), or the location of the damage
(e.g., territorial waters, contiguous zone, high seas). 2' This approach
often results in a "fragmented and piecemeal" means of correcting the
problem of ocean pollution.22 A successful program to eliminate the
damage caused by hazardous and noxious cargo pollution at sea
through imposing liability must be cohesive and proactive, and must
take into account all relevant factors, causes, interests, and
consequences. 23
II. THE INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION AND THE
SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM
A. The International Maritime Organization
The International Maritime Organization (IMO), the chief
United Nations (UN) agency that specializes in international mari-
time issues, "is a forum in which Member States can express their
views reflecting state or international shipping practice. ' '24 Member-
ship includes the traditional maritime powers and nations which rely
largely on other nations for their shipping. 25
20. Consideration of a Draft Convention on Liability and Compensation in Connection with
the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea, Submission Under the Lead
Country Procedure by Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands,
Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the US.S.R., IMO Legal Comm., 64th
Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 4, IMO Doc. LEG 64/4 (Jan. 25, 1991) [hereinafter 1991 Draft
HNS Convention].
21. CHARLES S. PEARSON, INTERNATIONAL MARINE ENVIRONMENT POLICY 41 (1975).
22. K. Ramakrishna, Environmental Concerns and the New Law of the Sea, 16 J. MAR. L.
& COM. 1, 8 (1985); see also infra note 30.
23. See De Bievre, supra note 4, at 61-62; Ramakrishna, supra note 22, at 19.
24. THE INTERNATIONAL MARITIME Organization 1 (Samir Mankabady ed., 1984)
[hereinafter Mankabady].
25. The countries with a special interest in shipping include Australia, Belgium, Denmark,
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The IMO was intended to be a conservative body; its decision
making method of conference, deliberation, and negotiation has
resulted in cautious change to international marine law and policy.
26
The UN originally intended that the IMO would not initiate interna-
tional legislation, but would advise periodic international conferences
of the need to act on maritime matters.27 However, international
marine pollution was not considered a problem in 1948.28 Since then,
increased recognition of the likelihood and degree of marine pollution
has resulted in increased IMO responsibilities, including a proactive
stance on preventing ocean pollution.29
Because its work is fundamental to the development of a liability
Finland, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Ireland, Iceland, Italy, Japan,
Liberia, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden, Spain, the United Kingdom, the United
States, and the Soviet Union. Wilhelm H. Lampe, The "New" International Maritime
Organization and its Place in Development of International Maritime Law, 14 J. MAR. L. &
CoM. 305, 306 n.5 (July, 1981). For a complete list of membership, see 1 THE RATIFICATION
OF MARITIME CONVENTIONS 1.1-4 (1990).
26. David. J. Bederman, Comment, Dead in the Water: International Law, Diplomacy,
and Compensation for Chemical Pollution at Sea, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 485, 509 (1986).
27. The purpose of the IMO is
to provide machinery for co-operation among Governments in the field of
governmental regulation and practices relating to technical matters of all kinds
affecting shipping engaged in international trade; to encourage the general
adoption of the highest practicable standards in matters concerning maritime
safety efficiency of navigation, and the prevention and control of marine
pollution from ships ....
Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultive Organization, Mar. 6, 1948, art.
l(a), 9 U.S.T. 621, 623, 289 U.N.T.S. 48, 48, reprinted with amendments in SINGH, supra note
1, at 3169, 3169-70 [hereinafter IMO Convention] (emphasis added).
Originally, the organization's powers were to make recommendations, convene confer-
ences, and draft conventions to submit to governments for approval. Lawrence Juda, IMCO
and the Regulation of Ocean Pollution From Ships, 26 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 558, 559 (July,
1977). Juda points out that one disadvantage to this unavoidably slow process is that treaty
provisions fall behind changing technology and social needs, encouraging individual States to
take unilateral action, which might disrupt international shipping. Id. at 574.
The original name of the IMO was the "Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultive Organ-
ization" (IMCO). The name was changed to IMO to reflect its "increasingly important role in
implementing the developing body of international maritime law." Lampe, supra note 25, at
305-306.
Note that this "recommendation only" function is in contrast to other United Nations
agencies, such as the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the International
Telecommunications Union (ITU), the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), and the
World Health Organization (WHO), whose charters empower them to adopt, revise, and
repeal international regulations which bind member States without further State action. Juda,
supra, at 573.
28. Juda, supra note 27, at 560.
29. For thorough histories of IMO's role in preventing marine pollution, see David
Abecassis, IMO and Liability for Oil Pollution from Ships: A Retrospective, 1983 LLOYD'S
MAR. & COM. L.Q. 45, 45-49; Ramakrishna, supra note 22; Lampe, supra note 25; Juda, supra
note 27.
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regime for marine pollution, this Comment extensively discusses the
Legal Committee of the IMO. This committee handles legal matters
that come before the IMO, including the legal aspects of a draft con-
vention such as the Draft HNS Convention.30 Upon completion of a
draft instrument, the Legal Committee submits it to a conference
which is open to all members of the United Nations, including those
nations not in the IMO. After adopting a convention, the conference
submits it to governments for ratification.31
B. The Nature of the HNS Problem
Since 1958, international trade in hazardous and noxious sub-
stances has greatly increased;32 as a consequence, the danger of dam-
age from pollution, fire, and explosion caused by HNS has also
increased. 33 Carrying large quantities of HNS on vessels at sea cre-
30. Ramakrishna, supra note 22, at 4. The IMO created the Legal Committee after the
Torrey Canyon incident in 1967 to prepare draft conventions on marine pollution. The Legal
Committee has drafted, inter alia, the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil
Pollution Damage, Nov. 29 1969, 973 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter 1969 CLC] (creating strict
liability for damage caused by the shipowner's oil cargo); the International Convention on the
Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, Dec. 18
1971, 1110 U.N.T.S. 57 [hereinafter 1971 Fund Convention] (where the shipowner cannot
meet his liability under the 1969 CLC, a supplemental fund will provide compensation to the
victim); MARPOL 73/78, supra note 2; and the Convention on Limitation of Liability for
Maritime Claims, Nov. 19, 1976, 16 I.L.M. 606 (1977) [hereinafter 1976 LLMC].
Ramakrishna argues that the shortcoming of this scheme is that all conventions were drafted
as a response to some environmental disaster. As a result, the scheme's development lacks
planning and forethought. See Ramakrishna, supra note 22, at 4-5.
For a discussion of how these conventions interrelate to form a framework for the initial
1984 Draft HNS Convention, see infra notes 78-85.
31. Ramakrishna, supra note 22, at 10-11.
32. Jonathan R. Pawlow, Note, Liability for Shipments by Sea of Hazardous and Noxious
Substances, 17 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 455, 457 (1985).
Advances in scientific technology and ship design and technology have contributed to the
increased shipment of hazardous goods at sea. Larger, safer ships can carry more HNS. Also,
because aircraft are forbidden by law from carrying most HNS, HNS is primarily shipped
worldwide by sea. Gold, supra note 5, at 185-186.
33. Pawlow, supra note 32, at 457-58.
The Transportation Research Board of the National Research Council suggests that HNS
transportation is increasing dramatically at sea and port areas. Minor HNS casualties can
result in major or catastrophic damage to the ship and her crew, the marine environment, the
shoreline, and the coastal population. Mark Abkowitz & Jorge Galarraga, Tanker Accident
Rates and Expected Consequences in U.S. Ports and High Seas Regions, reprinted in RECENT
ADVANCES IN HAZARDOUS MATERIALS TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH, AN INTERNATIONAL
EXCHANGE 161 (1986).
A five year study (1976-1980) cataloguing types of spills (accident, movement), locations
(harbor, bay, high seas), types of accidents (collision, fire, explosion, or grounding), number of
accidents, number of injuries, and monetary losses was conducted. The study concluded that
accidents occur more frequently in harbors than on the high seas, but that high seas spill rates
are greater than those in other locations and have higher rates of expected damage, due
primarily to the severity of the accident and the unavailability of assistance. The study
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ates the risk of HNS marine accidents. "These vessels pass through
the territorial seas of various countries, through straits and canals, or
call at ports, thus creating serious risks to certain communities and to
the marine environment in general."'3 4 Dangerous chemicals pose a
potentially great risk because they disperse more easily at sea and are
more toxic than oil. 3" The type, character, and quantity of the sub-
stance(s) released into the sea,3 6 the type of casualty resulting in the
spill, 37 the distance of the accident from population centers, the eco-
logical sensitivity of the surrounding area, the local weather condi-
tions,38 and the use of the water,39 all influence the magnitude of the
damage resulting from an HNS incident. The environmental and eco-
nomic costs of maritime casualties involving hazardous and noxious
substances can be astronomical," thus requiring quicker, more effi-
cient, and possibly more expensive cleanup of HNS 1
Early on, the international community (as embodied by the
IMO) did not perceive a strong need for an international liability
scheme for HNS accidents. The international community generally
lacked experience in dealing with HNS pollution damage42 and the
IMO doubted the likelihood of high cleanup costs.4 3 As a result, with
the exceptions of conventions addressing the intentional dumping of
hazardous waste and compensation for nuclear accidents at sea,44 the
concluded that amounts of HNS released vary significantly, depending on the cause and the
severity of the accident. Id. at 166-68.
34. Consideration of a Possible Convention on Liability and Compensation in Connection
with the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea (HNS), Submission by Poland,
IMO Legal Comm., 62nd Sess., Agenda Item 4, at 1, IMO Doc. 62/4/5 (March 14, 1990)
[hereinafter Submission by Poland 62nd].
35. Bederman, supra note 26, at 486. Oil is not the most noxious of marine pollutants
because cleanup efforts can separate it from the sea and marine bacteria eventually break down
its residue. HNS, on the other hand, does not biodegrade, and cannot be removed from the
sea. Marine organisms can also absorb HNS, affecting the entire food chain. CHURCHILL
AND LOWE, supra note 13, at 244.
36. For example, a hazardous substance can be released as solid, liquid, or gas, and may be
flammable or explosive. Pawlow, supra note 32, at 459 (citing International Conference on
Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection with the Carriage of Certain Substances
by Sea, Submission by the International Group of P & I Associations, IMO Doc. LEG/
CONF.6/14 at 4 (Feb. 27, 1984)). "Protection and Indemnity Clubs," insurance concerns
based in London, insure approximately 70% of the world's shipping. Bederman, supra note
26, at 488 n.15.
37. .e., collision, grounding, fire, explosion, or sinking. Pawlow, supra note 32, at 459
n.21.
38. Water temperature, and wind and current direction and speed can affect damage. Id.
39. E.g., navigation, recreation, or fishing. Id.
40. De Bievre, supra note 4, at 61.
41. Bederman, supra note 26, at 486.
42. De Bievre, supra note 4, at 63-64.
43. Id. at 66.
44. Bederman, supra note 26, at 487 nn.9-10 (citing International Convention for the
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international community has not developed international conventions
specifically to assign liability and provide compensation to injured
parties for damages resulting from maritime HNS accidents.45 Cur-
rently, an injured party must resort to the law of the country where
the accident occurs, which may place liability on the shipper, or, more
likely, the shipowner.46 Generally, damages from minor HNS inci-
dents are sufficiently covered, but major damages or catastrophes
receive inadequate coverage under traditional shipowner liability
limitations.4 7
Traditionally, prior to the mid 1960s, most maritime shipments
of dangerous cargo were by package.4" Because the IMO believed
that packaged substances would not create great damages, interna-
tional regulations, such as the International Maritime Dangerous
Goods Code (IMDGC),4 a focused on protecting the ship and crew
from fire, explosion, poisoning, or corrosion, rather than protecting
the external environment. 50  However, when HNS began to be
shipped in larger quantities and in bulk,51 the international commu-
Prevention of Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, Dec. 29, 1972, 26 U.S.T.
2403, 1046 U.N.T.S. 120 (applying to seas globally, and requiring parties to adopt measures to
prevent marine pollution caused by the dumping of hazardous, noxious, and radioactive
waste)); Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping From Ships and
Aircraft, Feb. 15, 1972, 932 U.N.T.S. 3 (applying to North Sea and Northeast Atlantic).
45. Bederman, supra note 26, at 487. Another convention that considered HNS was The
Protocol Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Marine Pollution by Substances
Other than Oil, Nov. 2, 1973, T.I.A.S. No. 10561, which authorized States to protect their
coastal areas from marine pollution by substances other than oil; this convention did not assign
liability or provide compensation for damages. Pawlow, supra note 32, at 459-60.
46. Pawlow, supra note 32, at 462.
47. Id. at 462-63. For example, under United States law, existing levels of liability
inadequately cover catastrophic HNS damages. Unless a shipowner's negligence is proven,
liability is limited to the value of the ship plus freight pending. Where there is loss of life or
personal injury, the shipowner is liable for another $60 per ton of the vessel. See 46 U.S.C. §§
191-194 (1982). If the incident involves catastrophic HNS damage, the vessel may have been
destroyed, rendering negligible the amount of compensation collected from the shipowner.
Two other United States statutes apply limitation of liability for HNS damage. Under the
Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. § 1321(a) (1982), the owners of vessels that discharge
hazardous material into United States coastal and inland waters are liable to the United States
for removal costs up to $250,000 or $150 per ton of the vessel, whichever figure is greater.
Also, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c) (1982) sets liability at the greater of $5 million or $300 per
vessel ton for damage to natural resources caused by HNS. These statutes cover different
injuries and may provide some compensation, but catastrophic damage, personal injuries, and
deaths due to HNS pollution are inadequately covered. Pawlow, supra note 32, at 462-63
nn.35-40.
48. HENRY, supra note 2, at 93.
49. See supra note 5.
50. De Bievre, supra note 4, at 64.
51. Solid and liquid chemicals, gases, products for and of the oil refinery industry, and
products of the nuclear industry are often transported in bulk. Today, 15% of the goods
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nity became more aware of potential environmental risks, including
external damage from explosion, fire, and pollution.5 2
The Torrey Canyon53 and Amoco Cadiz54 shipping accidents
illustrated the need for an international regime for HNS liability."
Exemplifying the reactive nature of the international community, the
IMCO56 called an emergency session in response to the Torrey Can-
yon disaster on May 4, 1967. At the session, the British Government
noted that international law inadequately dealt with pollution at sea.57
Great Britain further asserted that the international community
should not limit its interest in ocean pollution to oil, but should
include HNS.5 s As a result, during the late 1960s the IMO began to
develop codes for constructing, equipping, and operating ships carry-
ing dangerous chemicals in bulk.59 Unfortunately, codes generally
focused on maintaining ship safety, not preventing pollution.' Ship-
board HNS spills involving the Danish vessel Cavtat and Greek vessel
Klearcos magnified the problem,61 as did the later Dana Optima and
Mont Louis incidents. 62  Realizing the need for an international
transported by sea-30% of the total amount of HNS shipments-are in bulk form. HENRY,
supra note 2, at 92.
52. De Bievre, supra note 4, at 64.
53. The Liberian oil tanker Torrey Canyon grounded off the coast of Great Britain on
March 18, 1967, spilling 60,000 tons of oil into the sea and damaging 100 miles of British
coast. The spill eventually spread to Britanny on the French coast. Juda, supra note 27, at
558.
54. The American oil tanker Amoco Cadiz ran aground off the French coast on March 16,
1978, spilling 60 million gallons of oil and damaging 130 miles of French beach. THEODORE
H. ALLEGRI, SR., HANDLING AND MANAGEMENT OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS AND WASTE,
at 311 (1977); Paul Lewis, Last of an Oil Spill Arrives in Brittany Via Chicago, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 28, 1984, at A3. Although the Torrey Canyon and Amoco Cadiz incidents were oil spills,
the magnitude of the accidents alerted the international community to the need for
international liability and pollution compensation measures. The Torrey Canyon incident set
in motion the 1969 CLC and the 1971 Fund Convention, which have also formed the basis and
structure of the Draft HNS Conventions. See De Bievre, supra note 4, at 62-72; Juda, supra
note 27, at 562-72; Abecassis, supra note 29, at 45-49; Synopsis, supra note 6, at 824;
Bederman, supra note 26, at 488-92; see also infra notes 78-85 and accompanying text.
55. The Torrey Canyon incident demonstrated the inadequate preparation of the world
shipping industry for the consequences of a major maritime disaster. Gold, supra note 5: at
188.
56. "IMCO" was the original name of the IMO. See supra note 27.
57. Juda, supra note 27, at 562.
58. Id.
59. Bulk cargo is contrasted to packaged cargo, a distinction which will continue to
surface throughout the discussion of HNS.
60. De Bievre, supra note 4, at 64.
61. Bederman, supra note 26, at 486 n.7. The Yugoslav vessel Cavtat sank with 900 drums
of teramethyl lead off the coast of Sardinia in 1980; recovery of the drums cost $6 million. The
Greek vessel Klearcos sank off the coast of Sardinia in 1981 with a cargo of packaged arsenic
that damaged local fishing grounds and cost $10 million to clean up. Id.
62. Pawlow, supra note 32, at 458. Rough seas washed 16 tons of weed killer overboard
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"mechanism to provide victims with prompt compensation for dam-
ages resulting from the release of hazardous and noxious substances
into the environment, or from related fires and explosions, ' 6 the
Legal Committee began drafting an HNS liability convention in
1977. 64
III. THE 1984 DRAFT HNS CONVENTION
The first Draft HNS Convention, presented to the IMO by the
Legal Committee in 1984,65 provided a framework for compensating
the victims of HNS accidents. The Draft covered the release of HNS
into international or coastal waters or the atmosphere by shipboard
spill, fire, or explosion. The Draft also addressed loss of life, personal
injury, property, and pollution damages resulting from maritime HNS
releases.66  Further, it provided for pollution cleanup costs and pre-
vention. It listed forty-five hazardous and noxious substances, and
applied to seagoing ships and other seaborne craft67 carrying hazard-
ous substances as cargo in bulk.6 The Draft provided for strict liabil-
from the deck of the Danish ship Dana Optima in January, 1983. It was estimated that such
an amount, if the contents of the drums were exposed, could kill everything on a square mile of
the seabed. Thirty containers of uranium hexaflouride were on board the French freighter
Mont Louis when it collided with a passenger ferry and sank off the Belgian coast in August,
1984. Id.; Natalie Angler, A Shipwreck Sends a Warning, TIME, Sept. 10, 1984, at 33. Three
barrels of partially processed uranium were also on-board the freighter. Environmental groups
criticized that ships transporting nuclear cargo take inadequate safety measures.
63. Pawlow, supra note 32, at 455. The 1969 Diplomatic Conference that adopted the
1969 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (1969 CLC)
considered whether such a convention should also include HNS. However, the Conference
determined that too little was known about HNS. It adopted a resolution that IMO "intensify
its work ... on all aspects of pollution by agents other than oil." Mankabady, supra note 24, at
351-2.
64. Pawlow, supra note 32, at 464.
65. 1984 Draft HNS Convention, supra note 3.
66. The 1984 Draft HNS Convention defined "damage" as
loss of life or personal injury on board or outside the ship carrying the hazardous
substances, caused by those substances, and any other loss or damage outside the
ship caused by those hazardous substances. Damage includes the cost of
preventive measures and further loss or damage caused by preventive measures.
Id., art. 1, para. 6.
67. The 1984 Draft HNS Convention defined "ship" as "any sea-going vessel and any
seaborne craft of any type whatsoever carrying one or more hazardous substances as cargo."
Id. art 1, para. 1.
68. The Draft defined "hazardous substance" as "any substance listed in the Annex to the
present Convention when carried without any intermediate form of containment in a hold or a
tank which is a structural part of a ship or in a tank or container permanently fixed in or on a
ship." Id. art. 1, para. 5; Pawlow, supra note 32, at 465 n.56. The initial Draft only covered
damage caused by enumerated chemicals carried in bulk aboard a vessel. The Legal
Committee was concerned that including packaged substances would expand the list of
covered substances by several hundred items, increasing the cost of insurance and the
administration of the system. It also believed that packaged cargo presented less of a danger
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ity69 for the shipowners, 70 carriers and shippers7  of certain HNS
carried in bulk.72 Its framework was a "two-tier" system of liability
that held shipowners responsible for basic damages and shippers for
catastrophic damages up to a certain limit above the shipowner's limit
of liability.73 Joint and several liability attached to damage caused by
a collision or incident involving two or more ships if each ship was
carrying HNS and if the damage was not reasonably separable.74 A
compulsory insurance fund would compensate victims, 75 and the
than bulk cargo, partly because packaged cargo is shipped in smaller quantities. The 45
substances enumerated included high volume cargoes such as liquid natural gas, butane,
ethane, ethylene, vinyl chloride, propane, phosphorus, propylene, and creosote. 1984 Draft
HNS Convention, supra note 3, Annex 1; Mankabady, supra note 24, at 354-55.
69. Strict liability holds the actor responsible even if the harm was not intentional and was
not caused by failing to meet an objective standard of reasonable care. WILLIAM PROSSER, ET
AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 669 (8th ed. 1988).
70. The 1984 Draft HNS Convention, supra note 3, art. 3, provides for strict liability of the
shipowner. The Draft Convention defines "owner" as "the person or persons registered as the
owner of the ship, or, in the absence of registration, the person or persons owning the ship."
1984 Draft HNS Convention, supra note 3, art. 1, para. 3. A "person" can be any individual,
partnership, corporation, public or private body, or state. Id., art. 1, para. 2.
71. The 1984 Draft HNS Convention, supra note 3, art. 7, provides for strict liability of the
shipper for damage above the shipowner's limit of liability or ability to pay. The Draft defined
"shipper" as "the person on whose behalf, or by whom as a principal, the hazardous
substances are delivered for carriage." Id. art. 1, para. 4.
72. The 1984 Draft HNS Convention defined bulk substances as those carried "without any
intermediate form of containment in a hold or a tank which is a structural part of a ship or in a
tank or container permanently fixed in or on a ship." Id. art. 1, para. 5. See supra note 67.
The Legal Committee decided to exclude packaged cargo from the Draft based on the findings
of an informal group of experts who advised that including packaged cargo would complicate a
reasonable list of covered substances and that the minimum levels of HNS requiring insurance
would be arbitrary. See De Bievre, supra note 4, at 81-87.
73. The Draft stated "[t]he owner at the time of an incident of a ship carrying hazardous
substances as cargo shall be liable for damage caused by any such substance during its carriage
by sea .... 1984 Draft HNS Convention, supra note 3, art. 3. In the second tier of liability,
the shipper of a hazardous substance is "liable to pay compensation to any person suffering
damage caused by that substance during its carriage by sea if such person has been unable to
obtain from the owner full compensation for the damage ... because the damage exceeds the
owner's [limitation of] liability . . . [or the owner] is financially incapable of meeting his
obligations in full." Id. art. 7. Although liability is strict, the 1984 Draft allows both
shipowner and shipper to claim such defenses as act of war, intentional act of a third party, or
negligence of the government in maintaining navigational aids for which it is responsible. Id.
art. 3, paras. 2-3.
The form and substance of this early draft is based largely on two previous liability
conventions dealing with oil pollution. The 1969 International Convention on Civil Liability
for Oil Pollution Damage (1969 CLC), supra note 30, and the International Convention on the
Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation of Oil Pollution Damage (1971
Fund Convention), supra note 30. The 1969 CLC holds the shipowner strictly liable for
damages and mandates insurance. The 1971 Fund Convention requires shippers and cargo
owners to indemnify the shipowner for liability that exceeds the shipowner's insurance rates.
Mankabady, supra note 24, at 350-51. See infra notes 78-85 and accompanying text.
74. 1984 Draft HNS Convention, supra note 3, art. 4.
75. The Draft reads:
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Contracting States had the responsibility of ensuring that shippers
and shipowners obtained the required insurance before transporting
HNS.7 6 Prospective plaintiffs would bring actions for compensation
only in the courts of the Contracting State on whose territory the
accident occurred. 7
The format of the HNS liability scheme originated largely from
the 1969 Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage
(1969 CLC)78 and the 1971 International Convention on the Estab-
lishment of an International Fund for Compensation of Oil Pollution
Damage (1971 Fund Convention). 79 The 1969 CLC provided for
strict liability of shipowners for oil pollution caused by their tankers.
It placed an upper limit of liability for oil pollution claims at 2,000
Poincare francs ($134.40) per ton of the vessel, or a total of 210 mil-
lion francs ($14.1 million), whichever was less. a° If the shipowner or
his insurer created a fund representing the limit of liability, no claim-
ant could exercise any rights against any of the shipowner's other
assets.8'
Because it soon became evident that the 1969 CLC did not pro-
vide adequate compensation in cases of catastrophic spills, 2 delegates
drafted the 1971 Fund Convention. The 1971 Convention is impor-
tant because, in an attempt to give relief to shipowners (by not
increasing their liability from levels set by the 1969 CLC), it intro-
duced the concept of distributing the risks of ocean shipping between
the shippers and shipowners, an idea that eventually was incorporated
The owner of a ship registered in a Contracting State shall be required to
maintain insurance or other financial security ... in the sums fixed by applying
the limits of liability . . . under the present Convention . . . The shipper of a
consignment of hazardous substances shall be required to maintain insurance or
other financial security, to cover his liability for damage under the present
convention.
Id. arts. 11, 1 IA. Claims under the Draft are allowed directly against the insurer. Id. art.
1 B, para. 3. The only exception to the compulsory insurance provision is the situation where
the shipper or shipowner was the government of the Contracting State. Id. art. 1 IB, para. 4.
76. Contracting States must ensure that both ships of their registry and ships of other
Contracting States loading or unloading in their ports comply with the compulsory insurance
provision. Id. art. 11C. The draft requires Contracting States to enact legislation to enforce
this obligation. Id. art. 1 IC, para. 3.
77. Id. art. 14, para. 1. Further, the courts of the State in which the compulsory fund
exists are exclusively competent to determine all matters concerning distribution of the fund.
Id. art. 14, para. 3.
78. 1969 CLC, supra note 30.
79. 1971 Fund Convention, supra note 30.
80. 1969 CLC, supra note 30, art. 5, para. 1. A Poincare franc is a gold franc.
81. Id. art. 6, para. 1(a).
82. In the case of the Torrey Canyon spill, supra notes 53-55, the 1969 CLC limited the
vessel owner's liability to about $8 million, which was less than half the amount of damage
caused by the spill. Bederman, supra note 26, at 489 n.30.
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into the 1984 HNS Draft. sa The Fund pooled the resources of oil
shippers as a secondary, supplementary source of compensation in
cases where the shipowner was insolvent or incapable of meeting obli-
gations, or where the oil pollution damage exceeded the 1969 CLC
limits on shipowner's liability. 4 The limits of liability under both the
1969 CLC and 1971 Fund Convention were increased in 1984.85 For
reasons discussed below, the same conference that approved the
increases in the 1969 CLC and 1971 Fund Conventions rejected the
1984 Draft HNS Convention.
Many essential details of the 1984 Draft HNS Convention were
not fully resolved before the 1984 diplomatic conference.8 6 Topics left
for development at the conference included the following: a specific
list of HNS covered by the Convention and whether to include pack-
aged goods; the definition of "damage"; which "tiered" compensation
scheme to adopt and how to ensure adequate funding; and a definition
of "shipper" specific enough to ensure that somebody could easily be
identified for liability purposes.8 7
At the conference, the delegates sharply debated the issue of
what constituted a "hazardous substance."8 8 The delegates initially
raised three questions, based on the assumption that the convention
would extend at least to bulk HNS: Should the regime extend to
chemicals carried in packages? Should it include flammable and
explosive substances? Should it specifically enumerate which sub-
stances were covered? 9 Although the initial treaty covered only
damage caused by enumerated chemicals carried in bulk aboard a ves-
83. Id. at 490. However, membership in the 1969 CLC does not require membership in
the 1971 fund. 55 states have ratified the 1969 CLC and 30 states have ratified the 1971 Fund.
A.H.E. Popp, Liability and Compensation for Pollution Damage Caused by Ships Revisited-
Report on an Important International Conference, 1985 LLOYD'S MAR. & COM. L.Q. 118, 119
n.6.
84. 1971 Fund Convention, supra note 30, art. 4, para. 1.
85. The former liability limits were no longer considered adequate. For example, the
Amoco Cadiz spill caused $53.77 million in cleanup costs and $500 million in economic
damages. Bederman, supra note 26, at 491 n.45. The $14 million liability ceiling originally
provided for in the 1969 CLC was increased to $60 million. Synopsis, supra note 6, at 833.
For an in depth discussion of the 1969 CLC, the 1971 Fund Convention, and the 1984
Protocols, see Popp, supra note 83.
86. United States Coast Guard Background Paper, Consideration of a Liability and
Compensation Regime for Damage Caused by the Maritime Carriage of Hazardous and
Noxious Substances 2-3 (1990) [hereinafter USCG Background Paper]; Gold, supra note 5, at
190; Bederman, supra note 26, at 492-93.
87. 1984 Draft HNS Convention, supra note 3; USCG Background Paper, supra note 86, at
1-3; Pawlow, supra note 32, at 470-80; Bederman, supra note 26, at 493-507.
88. Pawlow, supra note 32, at 474-75; Bederman, supra note 26, at 494-96.
89. USCG Background Paper, supra note 86, at 2-3; Bederman, supra note 26, at 494-96.
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sel,90 a number of delegates strongly advocated including HNS
shipped in packages. 91 Delegates proposed the following arguments
for including packaged chemicals: packaged chemicals had been
known to cause extensive damage; exclusion would render the new
regime irrelevant for coastal nations that suffer from spills of pack-
aged chemicals; and, if packaged chemicals were not included, ship-
pers could transport chemicals in packages to escape liability under
the Convention.92 Opponents of this position preferred a second, sep-
arate convention for packaged goods, because including them would
greatly expand the list of substances covered by the Convention and
create complicated problems of implementation and administration. 3
If packaged chemicals were included, the Convention would apply to
many more ships because most commercial vessels have the capacity
to carry packaged chemicals.94
Under the 1984 Draft, the claimant had a low standard of
proof-the claimant need not prove that the shipowner (or shipper, in
the second tier) was negligent, only that a hazardous substance as
defined in the Convention caused the injury.9" This standard of strict
liability was never at issue;96 the majority of the delegates favored it
even in the initial stages of negotiation.97 Strict liability was proposed
90. The 1984 Draft defined "hazardous substance" as "any substance listed in the Annex
to the present Convention when carried without any intermediate form of containment in a
hold or a tank which is a structural part of a ship or in a tank or container permanently fixed
in or on a ship." 1984 Draft HNS Convention, supra note 3, art. 1, para. 5.
91. Pawlow, supra note 32, at 474.
92. Bederman, supra note 26, at 495.
In discussing the early history of the 1984 Draft HNS Convention, De Bievre outlines
reasons for including packaged HNS cargo:
(1) ships carrying HNS in bulk are built for that purpose and are therefore
relatively safe;
(2) bulk ships are operated by highly trained crews and terminal personnel;
(3) packaged HNS is carried at random on general cargo ships;
(4) handling and stowing of packaged HNS lacks due care and vigilance;
(5) packaged cargo shipment is increasing, and is surpassing the rate of bulk
shipping;
(6) limiting application to bulk transport would cause shippers to shift to
packaged HNS as the preferred method of shipment to escape liability.
De Bievre, supra note 4, at 87.
93. Pawlow, supra note 32, at 474.
94. Bederman, supra note 26, at 494-95.
95. 1984 Draft HNS Convention, supra note 3, art. 3, para. 1. The Draft stated: "[T]he
owner at the time of an incident of a ship carrying hazardous substances as cargo shall be
liable for damage caused by any substance during its carriage by sea..." Id. The defenses
available to the owner were act of war, exceptional natural phenomenon, act or omission of
third party done with intent to cause damage, negligence or wrongful act of the Government,
or negligence of the victim. Id. art. 3, paras. 2-3. See also Bederman, supra note 26, at 499.
96. Bederman, supra note 26, at 499.
97. Id. at 488. Some delegations favored fault-based liability with the burden of proof
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in order to avoid time consuming, costly litigation and to ensure
speedy compensation.98 However, the conference delegates vigor-
ously debated imposing liability on both the shipowner and the ship-
per of HNS cargo. The inability of the delegates to agree on this issue
was a primary reason why they did not adopt the 1984 Draft HNS
Convention.99
The concept of strict, two-tiered liability between the shipper and
shipowner advanced by the 1984 Draft1 "° departs from current admi-
ralty practice. 10' Notwithstanding the 1969 CLC and 1971 Fund
Convention (which were negotiated and established separately), ship-
per's liability is a relatively new concept in maritime law, which nor-
mally channels liability to the shipowner who has the most
operational control of cargo at sea.' 0 2 The 1984 Draft, however, ren-
ders the shipper liable if the shipowner, who has primary liability,
does not provide full compensation because of financial inability or
limitation of liability.0 3 This scheme essentially results from a policy
of diversifying risk and allocating cost. The shipowner has exclusive
shifted to shipping interests. Id. Insurance interests, the primary opponents to strict liability
as applied to the shipper, argued that no traditional insurance system existed for such liability
and that setting up such a system would be very expensive and would adversely affect
international trade. De Bievre, supra note 4, at 74. De Bievre asserts that the 1984 HNS
Convention lacked support primarily due to uncertainty about the new regime's effect on the
insurance market. Id. at 77.
98. De Bievre, supra note 4, at 74.
99. Id. at 74-77; Bederman, supra note 26, at 498-501; Pawlow, supra note 34, at 470-71.
100. The 1984 Draft HNS Convention, supra note 3, art. 3, proposed primary liability for
the shipowner. The Draft further provided for secondary shipper liability as follows: "The
shipper of a hazardous substance shall be liable to pay compensation to any person suffering
damage... if such person has been unable to obtain from the owner full compensation ...
because the damage exceeds the owner's limitation of liability, [or] ...the owner is ...
financially incapable of meeting his obligations ..." Id. art. 7, paras. l(a)-(b). The shipper
had the same defenses available as the shipowner. Id. art. 7, para. 5.
101. General admiralty law requires some finding of negligence before imposing liability.
See THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW §§ 4-1 - 4-17 (1987).
However, the Clean Water Act, supra note 47, and the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, supra note 47, place strict liability on the party
causing the pollution.
102. De Bievre, supra note 4, at 69. This may not be true for HNS, where operating
procedures may have little to do with an accident caused by improper shipper packaging or
handling.
103. Traditionally, admiralty has limited a shipowner's liability for negligent acts. The
general maritime law, codified in the Limitation of Shipowners' Liability Act, 46 U.S.C.
§§ 181-189, provides that shipowners can limit their liability for damages to the value of the
ship itself or freight pending. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 101, § 14-1.
The 1984 Draft HNS Convention provided two alternatives for limiting the liability of the
shipowner: a liability scheme based on the liability levels set in the 1976 LLMC and its
amendments, or an independent level based on an amount that was yet to be determined. 1984
Draft HNS Convention, supra note 3, arts. 6C, 6A, 6B. However, the Draft denied the
shipowner any limitation on his liability if "the damage resulted from his personal act or
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responsibility for the safe operation of the vessel and the safety of the
goods in custody. On the other hand, the shipper is responsible for
placing HNS into maritime commerce, and imposing liability on the
shipper encourages proper identification and packaging of
substances. 104
Delegates to the Convention argued chiefly about this "two-tier"
arrangement (primary liability of the shipowner, secondary liability of
the shipper).105 First, the shipowning interests attempted to disavow
all liability, arguing that this posed an unreasonable burden because
vessels carrying HNS at that time constituted only five percent of the
world's tonnage. 106 Shipowners argued that shipping HNS was a
joint venture between the shipowner and the shipper. Additionally,
shipowning interests argued that, unlike most cargoes carried at sea,
the hazardous nature of the substance shipped and the packing proce-
dures used, which are the responsibilities of the shippers and not the
result of shipboard procedures, are the key sources of danger.
10 7
Damage from HNS does not necessarily result from inadequacies in
ship conduct or from other factors in the shipowner's control, but
from the inherently harmful characteristics of HNS and from unsafe
packing, which are the responsibilities of the shipper. 108 Finally, the
shipowners argued that the marine insurance market capacity could
not support increased liability levels, and that shippers have deeper
pockets. 109
To counter the position of the shipowners, shippers argued that
traditional maritime casualties (groundings, collision, fire) result from
operator negligence, and that shippers could do little to reduce those
risks of carriage. 110 Shipowners control crew training, vessel opera-
tion, and navigation. I" Further, shipper liability is generally incon-
sistent with customary international and domestic maritime law. "2
Also, shipowners would have less incentive to police their actions.
The International Union of Marine Insurers (IUMI) argued that,
because no traditional insurance market capacity to cover civil liabil-
ity of the shipper existed, creating the required scheme would be very
omission, committed with intent.., or recklessly and with knowledge that such damage would
probably result." Id. art. 6A.
104. Mankabady, supra note 24, at 356-57.
105. De Bievre, supra note 4, at 69.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. 7 Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) No. 5, at 139 (May 9, 1984); Pawlow, supra note 32, at 470.
110. Id. at 470-71.
111. Id. at 471 n.101.
112. See supra notes 100-104 and accompanying text.
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expensive; an insurance system for covering shipowner liability
already existed." 4 Finally, shipping concerns argued that victims of
HNS damage should be able to look to one party for compensation;
the shipowner is the party most easily and effectively identified. 15
The delegates rejected the proposed alternative schemes." 6
Another difficulty arose with the Legal Committee's definition of
"shipper." Because proposed second-tier liability, as provided for in
the Draft HNS Convention, lies with the shipper, the Legal Committee
decided that the shipper should be clearly identifiable and have access
to an insurance market.' 7 Unlike oil shipping, however, identifying
an HNS shipper for liability for pollution damages can prove difficult.
With oil, the same business generally controls the drilling, transport,
refining, and distribution of the product. Identifying the oil shipper is
easy and makes shipper liability workable.1 8 However, problems cre-
ated by carrying HNS at sea are much more complex. Different con-
signments may make up HNS cargoes, various types of vessels
transport it, and the chemical industry is diverse.' 9 With HNS, vari-
ous unrelated parties such as "the manufacturer, the consignee or
buyer, the freight forwarder, the reseller, or the trading concern"
might have an interest in shipping the cargo. 20  Shipping concerns
also argued that shippers of small quantities of substances "would
bear an unreasonable insurance cost."'' The Legal Committee, the
shipping interests argued, did not adequately account for these inter-
ests by broadly defining the "shipper" as the "person, on whose
behalf, or by whom as a principal, the hazardous substances are deliv-
113. De Bievre, supra note 4, at 74.
114. See Pawlow, supra note 32, at 477.
115. Mankabady, supra note 24, at 359.
116. Alternative schemes considered were to hold the shipowner and shipper jointly liable;
shipper primarily liable with shipowner responsible for damage above the shipowner's limit of
liability or ability to pay; shipper solely liable (rejected as too expensive to set up an insurance
market); and shipowner solely liable (rejected as providing inadequate compensation for
catastrophic damage). Mankabady, supra note 24, at 359; Bederman, supra note 26, at 499.
The Federal Republic of Germany suggested that each cargo be insured so that direct action
could proceed against the insurance company in a scheme resembling no fault insurance. This
proposal was criticized for not fully eliminating shippers' personal liability, and for not
assigning fault. Pawlow, supra note 32, at 472-73. Because of the problems with the existing
shipowner insurance system and the need for an additional "deep pocket" to provide
adequately for catastrophic damage, most delegations favored the primary tier shipowner,
secondary tier shipper liability as a basis for future work. Mankabady, supra note 24, at 359.
117. Id. at 364 (citing Report of the Legal Committee, IMO Legal Comm., 43rd Sess., paras.
20-24, IMO Doc. LEG 43/5 (1980); Report of the Legal Committee, IMO Legal Comm., 44th
Sess., paras. 29-34, IMO Doc. LEG 44/7 (1980)).
118. Bederman, supra note 26, at 500.
119. Submission by Poland 62nd, supra note 34, at 1.
120. Bederman, supra note 26, at 500.
121. Pawlow, supra note 32, at 472.
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ered for carriage."' 122
Many delegations also opposed the definition of "shipowner."'
' 23
Many bareboat charterers, rather than owners, actually exercise con-
trol of the vessel.' 24 The proposed definition of shipowner eases the
determination of who owns the ship by simply relying on the ship's
registry lists; the potential liability for a shipowner who does not have
operational control of the vessel is disadvantageous.
The 1984 Conference did not ratify a new HNS liability regime,
thus resulting in the IMO's first outright rejection of any convention
proposed by the Legal Committee. 125 Critics blamed this rejection on
the meeting's cramped timetable, 26 the general lack of confidence in
the Legal Committee's preparatory work, 27 and the lack of a formal
agenda. 28  The interrelatedness of the issues presented prevented
determination of any single issue.' 29 Finally, the power of the envi-
ronmental lobby weakened from the time the Legal Committee com-
menced work to the time of the conference 30 because fears of
imminent pollution damage requiring immediate action had abated.
The lack of a major HNS incident in the then-recent past left the
delegates without a strong incentive to negotiate successfully.' 3 '
122. Id.; 1984 Draft HNS Convention, supra note 3, art. 1, para. 4. Again, this definition
works better for an oil shipper than an HNS shipper.
123. The 1984 Draft HNS Convention defines "shipowner" as "the person or persons
registered as the owner of the ship or, in the absence of registration, the person or persons
owning the ship." Id. art. 1, para. 3.
124. See infra note 196 for a definition of "bareboat charter".
125. Bederman, supra note 26, at 492.
126. Id. at 492. In three weeks of meeting, the international conference not only included
the 1984 Draft HNS Convention, but also revisions of the 1969 CLC and 1971 Fund
Convention on its agenda. Not enough time was available to reach consensus on the HNS
issues in contention.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. The issues in the HNS Convention negotiations were highly interrelated. For example,
the issue of whether to include packaged HNS greatly complicates ascertaining the shipper's
identity, the two tier system, administering the compulsory insurance scheme, and also
increases the number of vessels subject to the Convention. On the other hand, valid reasons
exist for including packaged cargo. See supra note 92 and accompanying text; Bederman,
supra note 26, at 494-95.
130. Work commenced in September 1977, and the conference commenced in April 1984.
131. Bederman, supra note 26, at 512. The Mont Louis incident was yet to occur. See supra
note 62. Indeed, the international regime has been criticized as too reactive. In hastening to
respond to accidents, international efforts have foregone careful planning and forethought.
Bederman closes by sadly musing that a new liability regime may not be concluded until a
new, major HNS disaster of international scope occurs. Id. at 514. This sentiment is echoed in
Pawlow, supra note 32, at 457.
1028
CARRIAGE OF HNS AT SEA1
IV. RECENT AcTIvITY
A. The United States' Position
Throughout the development of the 1984 Draft HNS Convention,
the United States delegation to the Legal Committee supported the
initiative, focusing on problems from a legal, technical and equitable
standpoint, arguing that further study was necessary. 132 The United
States is primarily concerned with protecting its people, its ports, and
its environment from HNS damage. To that end, the United States
desires that the victims of HNS damage receive adequate compensa-
tion, that the responsible parties are held responsible for the damage,
and that the resulting system should be administratively feasible.
133
On the other hand, as a major importer and exporter of chemicals and
other substances that would be classified as HNS, the United States
desires to protect its chemical industries and improve the balance of
trade. 134 Also, the United States has an interest in maintaining its
own environmental programs. 13-
The United States strongly endorsed the HNS Convention in
principle, but objected to the proposed limits of liability as too low to
adequately protect the victims of maritime disasters involving
HNS.136 Further, the United States viewed the compulsory insurance
provisions as unduly burdensome on small shippers and on develop-
ing nations seeking to enter the shipping industry. 13  The United
States supported creating a separate regime for HNS damage consis-
tent with the previous protocols on oil pollution, the 1969 CLC and
1971 Fund Convention, to ensure that the victims of catastrophic
incidents would not have to compete for compensation with non-HNS
claimants.' 38
Also, the U.S. viewed the two-tier liability system as "flawed,"
"primarily because of the unworkable definition of 'shipper' and the
anticipated problems in obtaining adequate insurance at a reasonable
cost."'1 39 A primary concern of the United States delegation was that
132. USCG Background Paper, supra note 86, at 2.
133. Pawlow, supra note 32, at 475-76.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 456 n.10.
137. Id.
138. USCG Background Paper, supra note 86, at 2. For example, the 1976 LLMC, supra
note 30, provides compensation for HNS related damages, but has not entered into force
because its liability limitations render compensation inadequate and because its broad
application forces victims of HNS incidents to compete with non-HNS claimants, diluting the
limited compensation available to HNS victims. Pawlow, supra note 32, at 461-62.
139. USCG Background Paper, supra note 86, at 2.
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shipper liability is potentially unfair to United States shippers who
compete with European shippers throughout the world. The geogra-
phy of the United States requires HNS shipment by sea to Europe;
European shippers of HNS would not encounter the same increased
insurance costs as American shippers because much of their HNS
travels over land. This increased cost to United States shippers vis-a-
vis European shippers might result in lost sales."4 To facilitate
acceptance of a two-tier system,'viewed by the United States as neces-
sary to provide adequate compensation, the United States urged a
broader definition of shipper. 4 '
In 1988, the United States delegation submitted a position
paper 42 that urged the Legal Committee to study all practical HNS
options carefully 143 and to proceed with work before a major casualty
occurred. To provide structure for the regime's development, the
United States proposed a number of general principles: (1) any
regime should provide necessary funding for reasonable environmen-
tal response and adequate compensation for claimants; (2) any
regime should be practical and account for the operational and eco-
nomic realities of the maritime, chemical, and insurance industries;
(3) any regime should allow those held liable some recourse against
third parties in the case of strict liability; (4) costs of the compensa-
tion scheme should be shared among the commercial parties who ben-
efit from shipping HNS; and (5) as the scope of covered risks
becomes broader, higher liability limits should be employed to pro-
vide adequate compensation.'" The paper seemed to indicate a shift
140. Pawlow, supra note 32, at 476. During the conference the American delegation
received an Office of Management and Budget (OMB) communication expressing concern that
American industry could be adversely affected by an HNS convention. USCG Background
Paper, supra note 86, at 3.
141. The proposed definition included the:
person who designates, as a principle, a specific ship for transport of a listed
hazardous substance. Where the shipowner or ship operator selects the ship
under the terms of the charter party or contract of affreightment, the owner or
the vessel operator shall be deemed to be the agent of the shipper.
USCG Background Paper, supra note 86, at 2. This definition would satisfy those delegates
who wanted to see increased operator liability.
142. Consideration of the Question of Liability for Damage Caused by the Maritime Carriage
of Hazardous and Noxious Substances (HNS), Submission by the United States, IMO Legal
Comm., 59th Sess., Agenda Item 5, IMO Doc. LEG 59/5/1 (Mar. 30, 1988) [hereinafter
Submission by the United States 59th].
143. The United States suggested "that the broader the scope of covered risks and type of
harm, the higher the limits of liability must be to provide (1) sufficient funding for
environmental response and cleanup; and (2) adequate compensation for damages."
Complicating the equation is the capacity of the insurance market to insure for catastrophic
damage. Id. at 2.
144. Id. at 1-2. The 1991 Draft HNS Convention, supra note 20, a joint submission to which
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in the United States' thinking toward including packaged cargoes in
the resulting convention. To promote study, the United States paper
listed seven technical questions concerning packaged cargoes. 4 ' Fur-
ther, it recognized the significant potential harm posed by packaged
HNS. 46 The United States followed up these questions by providing
a framework of essential elements and related issues to the 60th ses-
sion of the Legal Committee in September 1988.147 The United States
has sought interagency, Congressional, and public input concerning
the shipment of HNS throughout the study process, into late 1991.148
B. Developments Since 1987
Despite the 1984 Convention's inability to reach an agreement, 149
the United States is a party, addresses and incorporates each of these concerns. See infra notes
220-274.
145. The questions were:
1. What selection criteria should be employed in developing the list of
packaged HNS cargoes?
2. Should the covered HNS be listed as individual products as in the
Intervention on the High Seas Convention and other instruments or by reference
to classes such as those set out in the IMDG Code?
3. If the covered HNS are listed as individual products, what mechanism
should be employed for updating the list?
4. Should minimum HNS quantities be established as the threshold for
applicability of the convention to a particular vessel?
5. What account should be taken of the interactive potential of HNS
cargoes?
6. Should there be separate schemes for bulk and packaged HNS cargoes?
7. If the draft convention incorporates a requirement for verifying
insurance coverage, what are the practical implications associated with handling
packaged HNS cargoes, particularly when containers are employed for carriage?
Id. Annex.
146. Id. at 3.
147. Consideration of a Possible Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage
Caused by the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea, Submission by the United
States, IMO Legal Comm., 60th Sess., Agenda Item 3, IMO Doc. LEG 60/3/2 (Sept. 13,
1988).
148. Notice, U.S. Shipping Coordinating Committee (SHC) Meeting, Mar. 5, 1991 (dated
Feb. 6, 1991); Notice, U.S. Shipping Coordinating Committee (SHC) Meeting, Nov. 20, 1991
(dated Oct. 11, 1991); USCG Background Paper, supra note 86, at 8. The notices requested
the views of the public and of the maritime, commercial, and environmental interests.
For an overview of United States domestic HNS liability, see generally David A. Bagwell,
Hazardous and Noxious Substances, 62 TUL. L. REV. 433 (1988). Briefly, the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(3) (1986) prohibits the discharge of hazardous
substances in or on navigable waters. Hazardous substances are defined as substances other
than oil that present an "imminent and substantial danger to the public health or welfare,
including ...fish, shellfish, wildlife, shorelines, and beaches." Id. § 1321(b)(2)(A). The
Executive Branch has also published a complete list of hazardous substances that dictates
which spills must be reported. 40 C.F.R. § 116.4 (1990). For a detailed discussion of the
United States HNS regulatory scheme, see ALLEGRI, supra note 54.
149. See supra notes 65-131 and accompanying text.
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the delegates recognized the need for an international HNS liability
regime.1 50 In August 1987, ten nations jointly submitted an outline of
options to resume work, suggesting two alternate liability schemes:
(1) primary shipowner liability with secondary compulsory shipper
cargo insurance; and (2) shipowner only liability with increased lia-
bility limits of the 1976 LLMC (U.S. $100 million)"1 up to a level
providing sufficient compensation for all damage, including HNS, or
in the alternative creating a special layer (a "gap") available exclu-
sively for HNS damage above and beyond the general liability lim-
its.152 This proposal suggested further that any new system of HNS
liability should meet the following criteria: (1) packaged HNS, not
only bulk, should be included; (2) liability should rest with an easily
identifiable party; (3) as far as practicable, strict liability should be
imposed; and (4) any limit of liability should be sufficiently high to
adequately compensate for damage.1 53
In preparation for the 60th session, the Secretariat of the Legal
Committee prepared a list of questions, raised at the 58th and 59th
sessions, for use as a focal point of future work:
A. What should be the geographic scope of application?
B. What specific substances should be covered by the convention
and by what method should a list of substances be incorporated
into the convention and amended?
C. Should packaged substances be covered?
D. Should residual products and waste material transported for
dumping or incineration at sea be included in the scope of applica-
tion of the new convention?
E. How should "damage" be defined in the new convention?
F. Should costs for prevention and cleanup be compensated
under the new convention?
G. Should liability rest solely with the shipowner, or should it be
shared with cargo interests?
H. Should liability be strict?
I. What limitation amount should be established?
150. See De Bievre, supra note 4, at 73.
151. Id. The 1976 LLMC, supra note 30, attempted to codify a change in international
maritime law from a limitation on shipowner liability at the value of the vessel to the
maximum available capacity of the insurance market to insure maritime risks, regardless of the
vessel's value. The International Union of Marine Insurers testified in 1976 that this upper
limit in the market was $100 million per vessel, per accident. Mankabady, supra note 24, at
239-41.
152. USCG Background Paper, supra note 86, at 3-4. The contributing nations were
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic
of Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, and Switzerland.
153. Id. at 4.
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J. Who should be able to take advantage of the limitation of lia-
bility limits?
K. How should the new convention relate to the 1976 LLMC?
L. What are the insurance implications of each of the above
questions?' 54
The delegations to the 60th Session, October 10-14, 1988,
devoted two days to discussing HNS. Support had grown for a
regime that involved sharing the costs of compensation between the
shipowner and cargo interests. Also, the Legal Committee agreed
that the new convention should be based on strict liability. 155 Atten-
tion also focused on the lack of specific information regarding the
availability, total capacity, and cost of liability insurance. 156 The
London Group of Shipowners Protection and Indemnity Associations
(P&I Clubs) submitted a paper to the 60th session that asserted that
the volatile state of the insurance market made speculation as to
whether market capacity could cover increased liability under the lim-
its of an HNS convention impossible.' 57 Many delegations opined
that further study was needed on the impact of any proposed system
of liability on the insurance market.'
The United Kingdom introduced a proposal for a second tier to
provide supplementary compensation when the limits of the first tier
shipowner's liability were exceeded.5 9 Cargo insurers would fund
this second tier of compensation by collecting a levy from shipping
interests in order to finance the purchase of a "pool" of comprehen-
sive insurance. Shipping interests would prepay levies on export car-
goes of substances listed in the IMDGC, based on the value of the
cargo.' 6° A potential problem with this proposal is that a substance's
potential risk might bear little or no relation to its value.' 6' However,
the advantage of this scheme is its certainty. Cargo insurers would be
responsible for collecting the levies and applying them to insurance,
with violators facing criminal sanctions.
62
The definition of "damage" took firmer shape at the 60th session.
154. Consideration of a Possible Convention on Liability and Compensation in Connection
with the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea (HNS), Note by the Secretariat,
IMO Legal Comm., 62nd Sess., Annex 1, Agenda Item 4, IMO Doc. 62/4 (Dec. 15, 1989).
155. Id. Annex 2, para. 64.
156. Id. Annex 2, para. 13. The P&I Clubs insure 70% of the world's ocean tonnage against
various types of liability. Bederman, supra note 26, at 488 n.15.
157. Note by the Secretariat, supra note 154, Annex 2, para. 13.
158. Id. Annex 2, para. 14.
159. Id. Annex 2, para. 12.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
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Most delegations favored including loss of life and personal injury
wherever they occur, property damage that occurs outside the ship,
and the cost of prevention and cleanup in the definition. 63 Some
delegations, however, desired broader definition, including "any dam-
age caused by the dangerous nature of the substance. ' ' M Recoverable
preventive measures would include, if necessary, large scale evacua-
tion of people from coastal areas ordered by a government. 6
Whether or not purely economic loss would be covered remained
open for future discussion. Some delegations believed that individual
national legal systems would best decide this, but others advocated
international uniformity under precise convention provisions.1 66
On the issue of substances to be covered, although some delega-
tions continued to advocate covering only bulk cargo because of the
ease in administering a bulk cargo system, 67 and others advocated
covering only HNS which could cause catastrophic damage, 68 many
delegations favored a wide scope of application to include all HNS
incidents caused by either bulk or packaged cargo.' 69 The Legal
Committee focused on all levels of HNS damage, not only on cata-
strophic incidents. 7° Further, the Committee agreed, without preju-
dice to any final decision on the matter, to proceed with discussions
on the assumption that the new convention would apply to packaged
HNS. '7'
HNS received the highest priority of Legal Committee business
during the 62nd session, which convened April 2-6, 1990.172 This ses-
sion was devoted almost exclusively to HNS and focused on draft
conventions submitted by the Netherlands and the United King-
dom. 173 The draft submitted by the Netherlands proposed a liability
scheme under which the shipowners would be strictly liable up to a
specific level of HNS damage, which the draft left undefined. The
163. Id. Annex 2, paras. 24-29.
164. Id. Annex 2, para. 27.
165. Id. Annex 2, para. 31.
166. Id. Annex 2, para. 37. Some delegations believed that agreement on the concept of
"economic damages" was not possible because the concept varies widely among different legal
systems.
167. Id. Annex 2, para. 39.
168. Id. Annex 2, para. 40.
169. Id. Annex 2, para. 41.
170. Id.
171. Id. Annex 2, para. 58.
172. At the 61st session, the Legal Committee reaffirmed its previous position that top
priority should be given to work on the Convention during 1990. Note by the Secretariat, supra
note 154, para. 5.
173. The Secretariat outlined the list of issues, developed in the 58th and 59th sessions, to
be considered prior to any international conference to ratify a new Draft as follows:
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draft also did not impose a second tier of shipper liability.174
The draft submitted by the United Kingdom incorporated the
Netherlands proposal as its first tier, 7 but also included a second tier
international fund financed by a levy charged to cargo interests. The
proposed fund's purpose was to provide supplemental compensation
in cases where the first tier limits were exceeded.' 76 The United King-
dom proposed liability ceiling figures of $89.6 million standard draw-
ing rights (SDR) for the first tier and $300 million SDR for the
second tier.' 7 7 The submission favored a flat liability rate for ship-
owners, rather than a tapered rate based on vessel tonnage, because
one package of a particular HNS cargo might cause as much damage
as a 40,000 ton bulk HNS carrier fully laden with another type of
HNS cargo. 7 8  Levies charged on exports of HNS carried in bulk
would finance the second tier. '9 This system would simplify the levy
(1) What should be the geographic scope of application?
(2) What substances should be covered, and by what method should they be
incorporated and amended?
(3) Should packages be covered? (The list of issues suggested by the U.S.
was interposed here. See supra note 144).
(4) Should residual products and waste material transported for dumping or
incineration at sea be included?
(5) How should "damage" be defined?
(6) Should costs for prevention and cleanup be compensated?
(7) Should liability rest solely on the shipowner, or should it be shared with
cargo interests?
(8) Should liability be strict?
(9) What limitation amount should be established?
(10) What are the insurance implications of each question?
Note by the Secretariat, supra note 154, Annex 1.
174. Consideration of a Possible Convention on Liability and Compensation in Connection
with the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea (HNS), Submission by the
Netherlands, IMO Legal Comm., 62nd Sess., Agenda Item 4, at 5-6, IMO Doc. LEG 62/4/1
(Jan. 3, 1990).
175. The Dutch draft did not have a second tier. Consideration of a Possible Convention on
Liability and Compensation in Connection with the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious
Substances by Sea, Submitted by the United Kingdom Delegation, IMO Legal Comm., 62nd
Sess., Agenda Item 4, Paras. 6-7, IMO Doc. LEG 62/4/2 (Feb. 8, 1990) [hereinafter
Submission by the United Kingdom 62nd].
176. Id. Annex 2, art. 4, para. l(b).
177. Id. Annex 2, art. 4. The ceiling figures are roughly U.S $100 million to U.S. $310
million.
178. Submission by the United Kingdom 62nd, supra note 175, art. 7, para. 17(a). The
Polish submission to the 62nd session also favored a scheme unrelated to vessel tonnage.
Consideration of a Possible Convention on Liability and Compensation in Connection with the
Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea, Submission by Poland, IMO Legal
Comm., 62nd Sess., Agenda Item 4, para. II(D), IMO Doc. LEG 62/4/5 (March 14, 1990)
[hereinafter Submission by Poland 62nd].
179. Submission by the United Kingdom 62nd, supra note 175, Annex 2, at 7, para. 27.
Poland's submission specifically favored this proposal. Submission by Poland 62nd supra note
178, para. III(G).
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and collection procedure, and minimize the number of shipments
involved. The scheme, however, would compensate for damage
caused by both bulk and packaged substances.18 0 The second tier
would use the income received from the levies collected from cargo
interests to purchase insurance on the international insurance market
and to build up a cash "stand by" fund.""'
Many delegations expressed preliminary support for total HNS
compensation in the range of $100 to $300 million SDR. 8 2 The Pro-
tection and Indemnification (P&I) Clubs,18 3 however, reported that
because of the state of the current market conditions, the insurance
market worldwide had contracted; the insurance capacity for HNS
could not exceed $100 million SDR. 14 Also, most delegations agreed
that the shipowner should be strictly liable.8 5 Further, many delega-
tions recognized that adequate funding for compensation required the
shipowner and the shipping/cargo interests to share liability,1
8 6
thereby making the second tier necessary. 8 7 Although a second tier
supplemental compensation fund may be difficult to develop, the
Legal Committee endorsed continued efforts to refine the operating
features of the international fund proposed by the United
Kingdom. 18
The Legal Committee continued its progress at the 63rd session,
which convened September 17-21, 1990. Participation in and submis-
sions to the session were considerable, possibly indicating the dele-
gates' sense of a need for cooperation. 8 9 Major developments
included further endorsement of United Kingdom efforts to develop
180. Submission by the United Kingdom 62nd, supra note 175, para. 27.
181. Id. para. 26.
182. Report of the Legal Committee on the Work of its Sixty-Second Session, IMO Legal
Comm., 62nd Sess., Agenda Item 7, para. 20, IMO Doc. LEG 62/7 (Apr. 24, 1990)
[hereinafter Report of the Legal Committee 62nd].
183. The London Group of Shipowners Protection and Indemnity Associations ("P&I
Clubs"), insures 70% of the world's ocean tonnage against various types of liability.
Bederman, supra note 26, at 488 n.15.
184. Report of the Legal Committee 62nd, supra note 182, para. 18. Some delegations
doubted that this figure accurately represented the upper limit that would be available. Id.
para. 23.
185. Id. para. 24.
186. Id. para. 25.
187. Id. paras. 90-91.
188. Id. paras. 88-95.
189. Submissions to the conference were made by Poland, The International Group of P&I
Clubs, the United States, Norway, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of
Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the European Council of
Chemical Manufacturers' Federations (CEFIC). Report of the Legal Committee on the Work
of Its Sixty-Third Session, IMO Legal Comm., 63rd Sess., Agenda Item 4, para. 9, IMO Doc.
LEG 63/14 (Sept. 27, 1990) [hereinafter Report of the Legal Committee 63rd].
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the second tier of a possible two-tier regime, and adoption of "Guide-
lines and Terms of Reference" to direct the work of an ad hoc group
of experts who were asked to develop recommendations relating to
the technical provisions for the new HNS regime.'9° The Legal Com-
mittee narrowed discussion to the following issues: (1) the accepta-
bility of imposing liability on the operator of the ship; (2) linking the
HNS compensation scheme to the levels set in the 1976 LLMC;
(3) whether to establish a two-tiered HNS regime in one treaty or in
two; (4) defining "HNS damage"; and (5) the features of the possible
second tier.' 9'
The Polish delegation emphasized that the principal objective of
the convention should be to provide effective compensation to the vic-
tims of an HNS incident without undue delay.'92 To this end, the
delegation proposed that strict liability 9 3 for HNS damage should
attach to a vessel's operator, not the shipowner or the shipper,
because the operator creates the risk of incident.' 94 Only the operator
can exercise sufficient proper care to reduce the risk of an HNS inci-
dent to an acceptable minimum. 95 Also, placing liability on the oper-
ator accounts for situations where the shipowner parts with
possession and control of the vessel, such as letting the vessel on a
bareboat charter. 96 To ensure the regime's effectiveness, the Polish
delegation urged direct liability of the insurer to the victim. 97 Port or
customs authorities would inspect insurance certificates to the loading
of a consignment of HNS. 98
Notwithstanding Poland's proposal, imposition of liability on the
ship's operator instead of the shipowner or shipper lacked sufficient
190. Id. Annex.
191. Id. para. 18.
192. Consideration of a Draft Convention on Liability and Compensation in Connection with
the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea (HNS), Submission by Poland, IMO
Legal Comm., 63rd Sess., Agenda Item 3, para. 3(A), IMO Doc. LEG 63/3/1 (July 27, 1990)
[hereinafter Submission by Poland 63rd].
193. Poland advocated removing the legal concept of "willful misconduct" as a defense to
strict liability, because it was "a common law notion not fully understandable" to the civil-law
jurists of Europe. See id. para. 6.
194. Report of the Legal Committee 62nd, supra note 182, para. 16; Submission by Poland
63rd, supra note 192, para. 4. The Polish delegates argued tort liability should be linked to
undertaking a certain activity, here, operating the vessel, but not to the ownership of tools used
in the activity.
195. Submission by Poland 62nd, supra note 178, para. IIA.
196. Id. A "bareboat charter" is a charter or lease of a ship, where the charterer supplies
his own crew. For all practical purposes, the charterer is the owner of the vessel for the period
of the charter. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 149 (6th ed. 1990).
197. Submission by Poland 63rd, supra note 192, para. 6.
198. Submission by Poland 62nd, supra note 178, para. IIE.
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support at the session for several reasons.' 99 First, international con-
ventions on maritime law had generally imposed shipowner liability,
thus a precedent had been set for the convention to follow.200 Second,
most delegates had thought that ascertaining the shipowner's identity
through public documents could be done relatively easily, while the
identity of the specific operator at any given time could not always be
so easily determined. 201 Also, the shipowner's interest in the ship as a
whole created in the shipowner the inherent duty to supervise the
operator's activities.2 °2 Finally, the shipowner, not the operator,
would be responsible for obtaining the insurance necessary for any
compensation payable by an offending ship.2 °3
Shipping concerns continued to lobby against the second tier of
shippers' liability at the 63rd session. Arguing that a system of ship-
owner liability would sufficiently compensate all damage claims, the
European Council of Chemical Manufacturers' Federations (CEFIC)
asserted that "[t]he number of grave accidents connected with the
transport of 'HNS' substances is very small, and where such accidents
have occurred, adequate compensation has been afforded. ' ' 2°4 Should
a serious incident occur, the current marine insurance market would
have the necessary coverage capacity, and it should rest "with marine
insurers to provide shipowners and operators with the possible addi-
tional cover. ' 20 5 CEFIC feared a system of shippers' liability would
become "needlessly complicated, cumbersome to implement and
costly. ' 20 6 Finally, CEFIC viewed the imposition of shippers' liability
as a dangerous break between the operational responsibility of ship-
owners and civil liability, divorcing shipowners from accountability
for their conduct.20 7
At the 63rd session, the United States submitted an innovative
proposal to fund the second tier.20 8 The United States suggested an
199. Report of the Legal Committee 63rd, supra note 189, para. 19.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. para. 21.
204. Consideration of a Draft Convention on Liability and Compensation in Connection with
the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea (HNS), Submission by the European
Council of Chemical Manufacturers' Federations (CEFIC), IMO Legal Comm., 63rd Sess.,
Agenda Item 3, at 2, IMO Doc. 63/3/5 (Aug. 31, 1990).
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. This concern seems to be unfounded because the danger of transporting HNS may
result from the packaging and handling of the shipper as well as from shipowner error. See
supra note 102 and accompanying text.
208. Consideration of a Draft Convention on Liability and Compensation in Connection with
the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances (HNS), Submission by the United States,
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"HNS points approach," directly linked to the dangerous nature of a
particular substance, to provide a means of determining whether a
levy must be collected from the shipper in the case of specific ship-
ments of HNS. 209 The mechanism compared the hazardous potential
of a given substance with the quantity for shipment in order to deter-
mine whether a levy should be paid.210  Levies collected would be
pooled to establish and maintain a second tier supplemental insurance
fund. 21 1 The formula provides a balance between equity in the shar-
ing of costs to finance a second tier and simplicity in administering the
system. The proposal was met with support in principle, but several
delegations expressed concerns with respect to how it might actually
work.212
In the debate over the definition of "hazardous substance" at the
63rd session,21 3 several delegations recommended, for purposes of
administrative ease and cost efficiency, using lists of substances devel-
oped for the International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code
(IMDGC);2 4 however, other delegations argued that the mere inclu-
sion of previous lists would not meet the special requirements of a
IMO Legal Comm., 63rd Sess., Agenda Item 3, IMO Doc. LEG 63/3/3 (Aug. 17, 1990)
[hereinafter Submission by the United States 63rd].
209. Id.
210. Specifically, the points approach would work as follows: For cargoes included in the
IMO Code of Safe Practice for Solid Bulk Cargoes (IBC Code), which provides guidance on
shipping and handling of bulk cargo, the "hazard factor" would reflect the substance's safety
and marine pollution characteristics by taking into account the required "ship type" under the
IBC Code and the pollution category under MARPOL 73/78. See supra note 2:
Required Ship Type Pollution Category Hazard Factor
I any 3
2 any 2
3 A 2
3 B,C,D,III 1
"Quantity factors" could be assigned as follows:
Volume Quantity Factor
< 500 M 3  1
500 - 2000 M3  2
> 2000 M 3  3
Applying these values, the magnitude of the risk of carrying a certain cargo would be deter-
mined by the formula:
HNS Points = Hazard Factor (HF) x Quantity Factor (QF)
Levies would then be based on the amount of HNS points assigned. Submission by the United
States 63rd, supra note 208, Annex 2 at 1-2.
211. Id.
212. See Report of the Legal Committee 63rd, supra note 189, paras. 55-58.
213. See id. paras. 31-49.
214. Some delegations favored use of the old lists because of the benefit of experience
acquired in their use. Others thought that a new list would be unnecessarily lengthy, thereby
increasing the cost of freight and insurance. Id. paras. 32, 35.
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new HNS regime.215  The majority agreed that a new HNS regime
should cover the broadest possible range of substances in order to
meet the international community's objectives of protecting the
marine environment, pinpointing liability for accidents, and ensuring
compensation to victims. 216 To resolve some of the issues before the
Legal Committee, and to study and make recommendations as to how
HNS should be defined in the convention, the Committee established
a "Working Group of Technical Experts. ' 217 This group consisted of
experts in manufacturing, shipping, carrying, regulating, and the risks
of HNS.21 s
V. THE CURRENT DRAFT
At the end of the 63rd session, the Legal Committee asked the
United Kingdom to prepare a draft convention for consideration at
the 64th session.219  At the 64th session, held from March 18-22,
1991,220 eleven nations submitted a joint 1991 Draft HNS Conven-
tion22' under the lead country procedure.222 The 1991 Draft
215. Id. para. 33. The INTERNATIONAL MARITIME DANGEROUS GOODS CODE (IMDGC),
supra note 5, adopted in 1965, is a guide that provides mariners and shippers with information
on the nature of dangerous goods. The IMDGC is contained in five loose-leaf volumes and
lists nine classes of dangerous goods: explosives, gases, inflammable liquids, inflammable
solids, oxidizers, poisons, radioactive substances, corrosives, and miscellaneous. The code lists
substances; it does not constitute a regulation or liability scheme, and is not internationally
enforceable. Mankabady, supra note 24, at 86-88; Lampe, supra note 25, at 318; Gold, supra
note 5, at 186-87. Although some delegations have favored annexing the IMDGC to the HNS
convention as a listing of HNS, many delegations consider it too broad to be easily
administered, regulated, or insured.
216. Report of the Legal Committee 63rd, supra note 189, at 11, para. 38.
217. Report of the Drafting Group, Annex, Agenda Item 3, at 1, IMO Doc. LEG/WP.3
(Sept. 20, 1990). The Legal Committee gave the working group the following guidelines,
which provided strong indication of the Committee's thinking with regard to specific issues:
(1) The new regime will almost certainly impose strict liability on the
shipowner;
(2) The regime will be broad in scope with respect to the number of
substances included;
(3) Supplemental compensation is essential to ensure adequate coverage;
(4) The financing of the second tier would probably be based on levies on
bulk HNS; and
(5) A specific list of HNS should be included to ensure that government
officials and commercial interests who are responsible for daily implementation
can quickly ascertain the regime's requirements in any given case.
Id. See supra notes 190-91 and accompanying text.
218. Id. Annex, at 1, para. 2.
219. Id. at 14, para. 59.
220. Id. at 26, para. 130.
221. See 1991 Draft HNS Convention, supra note 20, Annex, at 1.
222. The "lead country" procedure allows nations to submit proposals to the Legal
Committee without being in any way bound to their terms during consideration and
negotiations. 1991 Draft HNS Convention, supra note 20, at 1 n. 1.
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addressed and incorporated many of the considerations discussed
above.22 a
A. Scope of the Convention
In order to incorporate concerns that substances covered by the
convention should be broadly defined, the 1991 Draft substituted the
term "dangerous goods" for the term "HNS" throughout the docu-
ment.224 The type of damage covered by the Draft also received
broad definition, consistent with the 1984 Draft.2 25 The 1991 Draft
also added an important provision absent from the 1984 Draft: where
the cause of loss is due to both dangerous goods and other factors,
and if the causes of the damage are not reasonably separable, "all such
damage shall be deemed to be caused by the dangerous goods. '226
The 1991 Draft has a broad scope of application. First, the Draft
223. See supra notes 132-218 and accompanying text.
224. 1991 Draft HNS Convention, supra note 20, para. 3.
The definition of "dangerous goods," and therefore the scope of the Draft Convention,
encompassed the following:
(a) oils carried in bulk and noxious substances as listed in the 1978 Protocol
relating to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from
Ships, 1973;
(b) Type I or Type II substances carried in bulk under the International Code
for the Construction of Equipment of Ships Carrying Dangerous Chemicals in
Bulk, 1972;
(c) Dangerous goods except nuclear substances as defined in the IMDGC;
(d) liquified gases listed in the International Code for the Construction and
Equipment of Ships Carrying Liquified Gases in Bulk, 1975;
(e) substances with flashpoints less than 60 degrees centigrade which could
explode during loading and unloading; and
(f) substances with explosion risks arising from previously carrying oil, liquified
gas, or substances capable of giving off gas with a flash point of less than 60
degrees centigrade.
Id. art. 1, para. 5.
225. 1984 Draft HNS Convention, supra note 3.
"Damage" as defined in the 1991 draft includes:
(a) loss of life or personal injury on board or outside the ship carrying the
dangerous goods caused by those goods;
(b) loss of or damage to property outside the ship carrying the dangerous goods
caused by those goods...;
(c) loss or damage by contamination of the environment caused by the
dangerous goods, provided that compensation for impairment of the
environment other than loss of profit.., shall be limited to costs of reasonable
measures of reinstatement... ; [and]
(d) the costs of preventive measures and further loss or damage caused by
preventive measures.
1991 Draft HNS Convention, supra note 20, Annex, art. 1, para. 6. "Preventive measures"
were defined as "any reasonable measures taken by any person after an incident has occurred
to prevent or minimise damage." Id. Annex, art. 1, para. 7.
226. Id. Annex, art. 1, para. 6.
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Convention applies to claims for damage caused by dangerous goods
at sea; however, it does not apply to those claims governed by specific
contracts for carrying goods or passengers, and "to the extent that its
provisions are incompatible with those of the applicable law relating
to workmen's compensation or social security schemes." '227 Only geo-
graphic area limits this application. 228 Also, the 1991 Convention
does not apply to damage caused by oil or nuclear substances gov-
erned by other conventions, or to damage caused by warships or other
ships owned by a state on non-commercial service.229
B. Liability of the Shipowner
Consistent with the 1984 Draft and with most of the discussion
and debate that has taken place since, the 1991 Draft extends strict
liability for damage caused by dangerous goods at sea to the ship-
owner.230 Defenses to liability include damages resulting from an act
of war or an "exceptional, inevitable and irresistible" natural phenom-
enon; damage caused by a third party's act or omission done with
intent to cause damage; and damage caused by the negligence or
wrongful act of a government responsible for maintaining naviga-
tional aids.23' The 1991 Draft also adds a new defense, not available
under the 1984 Draft. The shipowner is not liable for damage if the
consignor failed to inform the shipowner that the consignment con-
tained dangerous goods, and if the shipowner did not know nor could
have known of the goods' dangerous nature.232 Also, the shipowner
can be exonerated wholly or partially from liability if the victim
caused the damage either by personal negligence, or by an act or
omission done with intent to cause damage.2 33 Finally, the shipowner
227. Id. Annex, art. 3, para. 2.
228. Geographically, the Convention applies:
(a) to any damage caused in the territory, including the territorial sea, of a
Contracting State;
(b) to damage by contamination of the environment caused in the exclusive
economic zone of a Contracting State [or if a State has not established an
exclusive economic zone], in an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea of
that State ... extending not more than 200 nautical miles from ... its territorial
sea;
(c) to damage [other than environmental damage] caused outside the territory
... of any State, if this damage has been caused by a ship registered ... or...
entitled to fly the flag of a Contracting State; and
(d) to preventive measures, wherever taken ...
Id. Annex, art. 2.
229. Id. Annex, art. 3, paras. 3-4.
230. Id. Annex, art. 4, para. 1.
231. Id. Annex, art. 4, para. 2(a)-(c).
232. Id. Annex, art. 4, para. 2(d).
233. Id. Annex, art. 4, para. 3.
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can move against the consignor or consignee of the dangerous goods if
one of them actually caused the damage.2 34
C. Shipowner's Limitation of Liability
Article 6 of the 1991 Draft provides for limitation of liability of
the shipowner, but it does not provide for specific liability limits,
which presumably await negotiation. The owner cannot limit liability
"if it is proved that the damage resulted from his personal act or
omission, committed with intent to cause such damage, or recklessly
and with knowledge that such damage would probably result. 2 35
In order to take advantage of the Convention's liability limits,
the owner must establish a fund with the Court by depositing the sum
of liability or by producing some other guarantee.236 If the owner
successfully limits liability, the Court will distribute the fund among
all claimants "in proportion to the amount of their established
claims. ' 237 Under Article 9, claims for personal injury or death have
priority over other claims, up to two-thirds of the amount of the
fund.238
The proposed system also requires the shipowner to carry insur-
ance to cover the limit of liability.23 9 This will require Contracting
States to ensure that shipowners maintain this insurance for their
ships and keep record of it in the State's registry. Contracting States
will issue insurance certificates to be carried on board any voyage car-
rying dangerous goods, 240 retaining a copy of the certificate for their
files.241 Claims for compensation "may be brought directly against
the insurer or other person providing financial security for the
owner's liability for damage. "242 When an action is brought directly
against an insurer, any defenses to liability available to the owner, in
addition to the defense of willful misconduct of the owner, are avail-
able to the insurer.243
234. Id. Annex, art. 4, para. 6.
235. Id. Annex, art. 6, para. 2.
236. Id. Annex, art. 6, para. 3.
237. Id. Annex, art. '6, para. 4.
238. Id. Annex, art. 9, para. 1.
239. Under Article 10, "[t]he owner of a ship registered in a Contracting State and carrying
dangerous goods shall be required to maintain insurance or other financial security... in the
sums fixed by applying the limits of liability prescribed in article 6, paragraph 1 to cover his
liability for damage under this Convention." Id. Annex, art. 10, para. 1.
240. Id. Annex, art. 10, para. 2.
241. Id. Annex, art. 10, para. 2.
242. Id. Annex, art. 10, para. 8.
243. Id.
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D. The International Dangerous Goods Scheme
1. LIABILITY
The 1991 Draft Convention addressed the need for a second tier
of damage liability by establishing an "International Dangerous
Goods Scheme" (the "Scheme") 2" to "provide compensation for
damage in connection with the carriage of dangerous goods by sea, to
the extent that [recovery from the shipowner] is inadequate or
unavailable." '245 The Scheme requires each shipper of a dangerous
substance and each owner of a carrying ship to purchase a dangerous
goods certificate, stating the nature and amount of the cargo, and the
voyage to which the certificate relates.246 Funds collected will be
applied to compensate any victim damaged by dangerous goods car-
ried at sea if (a) the shipowner is not liable for the damage; (b) the
shipowner is liable for the damage but is incapable of fulfilling per-
sonal obligations and the liability limitation fund is insufficient to sat-
isfy the claim; or (c) the damage exceeds the owner's limit of
liability.247 The shipowner can also recover "expenses reasonably
incurred or sacrifices reasonably made ... voluntarily to prevent or
minimize damage... "24s
The Scheme does not provide compensation if the Director of the
Scheme proves that an act of war caused the damage, that the sub-
stance originated from a warship or from another Government owned
ship on non-commercial service, or that the incident did not involve a
ship.24 9 Further, if the Director of the Scheme or the owner proves
that the negligence of a victim or the act or omission of a victim done
with intent to cause damage did in fact cause the damage, they may be
exonerated wholly or partially as to that victim. 250 The 1991 Draft
provides for a ceiling figure for the liability of the Scheme, which is
yet to be determined. 25' As with the liability fund of the shipowner,
claims for personal injury and death have priority over all other
claims, "to the extent that the aggregate of such claims exceeds two-
thirds" of the Scheme's total liability.252
244. Id. Annex, art. 11.
245. Id. Annex, art. 11, para. I(a).
246. Id., art. 17., paras. 1-2.
247. See id. Annex, art. 12, para. 1(a)-(c).
248. Id. Annex, art. 12, para. 2.
249. Id. Annex, art. 12, para. 3(a)-(b). The Director is the legal representative of the
Scheme. Id. Annex, art. 12, para. 2.
250. Id. Annex, art. 12, para. 4.
251. See id. Annex, art. 12, para. 5(a).
252. Id. Annex, art. 12, para. 6.
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2. ADMINISTRATION
Scheme administration entails various functions: considering
claims against the Scheme; preparing its budget and managing its
income; calculating the market value of a dangerous goods certificate;
and supplying dangerous goods certificates to, and receiving funds
from, certificate issuing agents.25 3 The Scheme will be administered
by an Assembly consisting of all Contracting States254 and a Secreta-
riat headed by a Director.255 The Assembly is responsible to properly
execute the Convention, which entails approving requirements for
appointing issuing agents, for defining "contributing cargoes", and for
approving claims settlements.256
3. JURISDICTION OF CLAIMS AND ACTIONS
If an incident has damaged the territorial sea of a Contracting
State, the action must be brought in that Contracting State.25 7 If an
incident causes damage outside a Contracting State's territorial sea,
the action must be brought in the Contracting State where the ship is
registered, or the Contracting State where the owner has its residence
or principal place of business.2 8 Actions brought against the Scheme
must be brought "before a court competent ... in respect of actions
against the owner" who is or would be liable.259 The Scheme may
intervene as a party to any legal proceedings instituted under the con-
vention, and is not bound by any judgment or settlement to which it is
not a party.26 All Contracting States must give full faith and credit
to a judgment or settlement under the Convention, except for those
judgments obtained by fraud or obtained against a party not given
reasonable notice of the proceedings and a fair opportunity to
defend.26' Proceedings to enforce a judgment in any Contracting
State do not allow for review of the merits of a case.262
4. REACTION OF THE LEGAL COMMITTEE TO THE 1991 DRAFT
Initial reaction to the draft was favorable. Some delegations sub-
mitted proposals for revision of some portions of the Convention.
253. Id. Annex, art. 13, para. 1.
254. Id. Annex, art. 21.
255. Id. Annex, art. 20.
256. Id. Annex, art. 22.
257. Id. Annex, art. 33, para. 1.
258. Id. Annex, art. 33, para. 2(a)-(b).
259. Id. Annex, art. 34, para. 1.
260. Id. Annex, art. 34, para. 4.
261. See id. Annex, art. 35, para. I.
262. Id. Annex, art. 35, para. 2.
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Finland stated that passenger car ferries carry about one-third of the
dangerous goods moved on Finnish ships, and expressed concern that
"[t]he definition of damage in the draft HNS convention differs in a
significant way from the definition of pollution damage in the Con-
ventions on liability for oil pollution damage in the sense that damage
in the HNS convention includes also loss of life and personal
injury." '263 Finland expressed concern that an incident involving the
collision of two passenger ships, with one carrying dangerous sub-
stances, would raise complicated issues of liability and compensation,
resulting in the application of different conventions to the passengers'
claims. 264 "Passengers on board the ship not carrying dangerous
goods could base their claims for the HNS damage on the HNS Con-
vention, while the passengers on board the ship carrying dangerous
goods would be in a different position and could only present their
HNS claims according to the contract of carriage. "265 Finland rec-
ommended covering passengers involved in an HNS incident, regard-
less of the contract of carriage, under the Convention.266
While Australia "applaud[ed] the efforts of the Legal Committee
to include in the draft Convention a clause imposing liability for dam-
age caused by contamination of the environment, '267 it asserted that
"there is no reason ... to limit recovery for such environmental loss
to the EEZ or equivalent zone, even if the question of recovery for
such loss might occur only on rare occasions. "268 Australia and some
other nations have continental shelves which extend further than a
200 nautical mile EEZ, and some nations have nationals who fish
beyond the EEZ. 269 Australia recommended extending the scope of
protection to include this potential damage.270
The European Chemical Industry Council (CEFIC) approved of
the 1991 Draft's first tier shipowner liability, and of the second tier
which does not impose liability directly on the shipper. 27 1 CEFIC
263. Consideration of a Draft International Convention on Liability and Compensation for
Damage in Connection with the Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Sea, Submission by Finland,
IMO Legal Comm., 65th Sess., Agenda Item 3, at 1, IMO Doc. LEG 65/3/2 (Aug. 28, 1991).
264. Id. at 2.
265. Id.
266. See id. at 4.
267. New Draft Article 2(bb), Proposal by Australia, IMO Legal Comm., 65th Sess., Agenda
Item 3, at 1, IMO Doc. LEG 65/3/4 (Aug. 30, 1991).
268. Id. The EEZ is a nation's Exclusive Economic Zone. See supra note 8.
269. Id. at 2.
270. Id.
271. Consideration of a Draft International Convention of Liability and Compensation for
Damage in Connection with the Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Sea, Submitted by the
European Chemical Industry Council (CEFIC), IMO Legal Comm., 65th Sess., Agenda Item
3, at 2, IMO Doc. LEG 65/3/8 (Sept. 10th, 1991).
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continues to question the need for the second layer of compensation,
asserting that "the cover of 100 million SDR per incident-possibly
supplementing the 1976 LLMC limitations-should permit adequate
compensation in the vast majority of cases." '272 If the Legal Commit-
tee deemed the second tier necessary, CEFIC would approve of an
administrative compensation scheme, as established by the Interna-
tional Dangerous Goods Scheme. However, CEFIC was concerned
that the system of collecting contributions was impractical.27 CEFIC
recommended that shipowners be responsible for incorporating the
cost of contributing to the Scheme into the freight price and forward-
ing that levy to the Scheme on a quarterly basis. A shipowner who
failed to pay contributions in any year would be refused registration
until the contributions were paid.274
VI. CONCLUSION
Because the significant potential for a major catastrophe involv-
ing HNS,27 s an HNS Convention is needed to protect the victims of
future HNS incidents.276 The goals of such a scheme should be pri-
marily to stop marine pollution by deterring would-be polluters, and
secondarily to provide prompt and adequate compensation for claim-
ants, and effective, equitable, and peaceful vindication of the rights of
all parties. A proper scheme will insure funding for compensation,
environmental response, and cleanup. International law will benefit
by increased uniformity, with resultant beneficial effects on maritime
trade, navigation, and environmental health. Further, legal certainty
benefits the interests of marine transportation and third parties by
providing "guidance on the legitimacy, and compensability, of dam-
age claims. 277
The 1991 Draft should receive strong support from the interna-
tional community. 78 It incorporates three elements which seem to be
common to all discussions of the second, supplementary tier. First,
all discussions address the shipper's responsibility. Second, they
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Consideration of a Possible Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage
Caused by the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea, Submission by the United
States, IMO Legal Comm., 60th Sess., Agenda Item 3, at 1, IMO Doc. LEG 65/3/8 (Sept. 13,
1988).
276. Pawlow, supra note 32, at 457.
277. De Bievre, supra note 4, at 88.
278. Telephone Interview with Lt. Mark A. Yost, United States Coast Guard, United States
Representative to IMO Legal Committee (Jan. 25, 1991). For an additional discussion of the
British proposal, see supra notes 175-82 and accompanying text.
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include an on-board certificate as proof of payment of a levy or an
insurance premium. Third, they generally propose an international
body to operate or supervise the system.279 Under the current propo-
sal, HNS shipowners and shippers would be required to purchase an
HNS certificate, based either on bulk or amounts of HNS over a spec-
ified minimum quantity.280 Issuing agents from the government of
the Contracting State would be authorized to issue HNS certificates
on behalf of an international HNS body, which would collect the pay-
ments and then become the liable party, accountable to member
states.281 Contracting States would be responsible to examine a ship's
certificates in port, and for properly supervising issuing agents.282
This system would have the advantage of being relatively streamlined,
particularly with a restricted group of agents rather than a multitude
of shippers. Unfortunately, because the intermediate body would be
liable, this system would probably divorce a shipper from a sense of
responsibility for any accident caused by shipper negligence.
The maritime shipping of HNS creates complex problems. 2 3 A
system of compulsory insurance and a comprehensive list of HNS will
mean that most cargo-carrying vessels will be affected by the Conven-
tion to some degree.28 4 Procedures must be such that Contracting
States can enforce compulsory insurance and applicable safety stan-
dards. Also, the Convention must be easily amendable to account for
development, production, and shipment of new chemicals and other
forms of hazardous substances.283
If the Convention is to be truly workable, the IMO must aim for
liability limits that are consistent with the insurance market's capacity
and the magnitude of damages that may occur from catastrophic
HNS incidents.286 For ease in administration, all issues should be
resolved in a single document. The Convention should cover "both
packaged and bulk substances and, while being as broad as possible,
should support the development of a more comprehensive list of sig-
279. Consideration of a Draft Convention on Liability and Compensation in Connection with
the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances at Sea (HNS), Submission by the United
Kingdom Delegation, IMO Legal Comm., 63rd Sess., Agenda Item 3, para. 1, IMO Doc. LEG
63/3/7 (Sept. 3, 1990).
280. 1991 Draft HNS Convention, supra note 20, arts. 10-11.
281. Id., art. 14.
282. Id., art. 17.
283. See Submission by Poland 63rd, supra note 192, para. 3(B).
284. Most vessels carry HNS in some amount and form. Consideration of a Draft
Convention on Liability and Compensation in Connection with the Carriage of Hazardous and
Noxious Substances by Sea (HNS), Submission by the International Group of P&I Clubs, IMO
Legal Comm., 63rd Sess., Agenda Item 3, at 1, IMO Doc. LEG 63/3/2 (Aug. 13, 1990).
285. See Chircop, supra note 1, at 615.
286. Pawlow, supra note 32, at 477.
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nificant risk substances. 2 7 The fairest system of liability will spread
the risk of transporting hazardous cargo among those best able to pay.
Those who most often engage in and benefit from an activity should
bear its costs.2 8 Here, the shipowners and shippers should be respon-
sible to insure against HNS catastrophes, while spreading the cost of
that increased insurance to the hazardous substance consumer. This
insurance interest could also prompt insurers to keep better track of
the practices and safety records of their policyholders.289
An adequate definition of "shipper" must meet two concerns:
"[f]irst, the victim should not have to untangle a chain of commercial
transactions to determine which party to sue; second, that the defini-
tion must impose liability on some party in the best position to have
insurance. '' 290 The shipper must be clearly identifiable prior to the
voyage, and must have the financial resources to adequately insure the
shipment.291 In response to those who argue that vessel operators
should be held liable, the definition of "shipowner" could be
expanded to include carriers and operators of vessels when the owner
does not retain control.292 This would ensure that the party most
responsible in any given incident would bear the most liability, and
may force both shipowners and shippers to promote a positive and
active safety attitude among their personnel.
Aside from providing adequate compensation to victims of
marine disasters, the international community needs to protect the
environment, people, and ports from the tragic effects of HNS prior to
an accident. Carrying HNS means that specific measures for han-
dling, packaging, loading, personnel training, and vessel operations
must be promulgated, used, enforced, and frequently updated.293 The
IMO should tighten and vigorously enforce "construction, safety, and
prevention standards that are currently in effect to minimize the
probability of HNS incidents. ' 294 Also, the international community
should improve tracking requirements of HNS shipments and the
advance notification systems for governments that are importing
HNS. 29' Finally, the world community must remember that it is both
the right and the responsibility of each nation to protect and preserve
287. Id. at 479.
288. See Mankabady, supra note 24, at 349-350.
289. Submission by the European Council of Chemical Manufacturers' Federation (CEFIC),
supra note 189, at 2.
290. Mankabady, supra note 24, at 364.
291. Id.
292. Pawlow, supra note 32, at 478-79.
293. Chircop, supra note 1, at 615.
294. Pawlow, supra note 32, at 481.
295. Id.
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the marine environment.296 International standards are required and
can only be effective if each state participates.297 In a regime to pro-
tect the world's oceans from dangerous substances, a liability and
compensation scheme can only be part of an overall international
maritime safety and pollution prevention program.
ROBERT S. SCHUDA
296. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
297. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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